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ABSTRACT 
 
This study addressed the convergence of academic and corporate board governance 
practices. The qualitative description case study was conducted through interviews with 
chief executive officers (CEOs) who also served as academic trustees. The purposive 
sample of chief executive officers represented six colleges and universities located in the 
Midwest and Eastern states in the USA, and they embodied diversity in terms of gender 
and race. The interview approach brought to the fore the perspectives of the participants 
themselves comparing the two board governance models. Board meetings are convened 
behind closed doors, and the interviews allowed the researcher to glean the best practices 
of the two governance traditions, as described by the participants. The study findings 
identified the CEOs’ perspectives on board member selection and expertise; making 
decisions; maintaining mission and shareholder value; and, personal and professional 
rewards. The study also documented the views of CEOs comparing corporate and 
academic board governance on: Corporate influences, notable distinctions, academic 
lessons, and best practices in a unique discourse on the convergence of their corporate 
and academic governance experiences. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Governance boards are responsible for the ethical, legal, and operational oversight 
of the organizations they represent signifying important consequences for society 
(Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008). In the social dynamic of principal agency theory 
within organizations, the duties of governance are charged to boards of directors in the 
corporate construct and in boards of trustees in academia (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010; Bastedo, 2009). Governance boards are sanctioned to protect the public 
interest. In this descriptive case study of board governance, the following chapter will 
introduce the research problem, discuss the background on the research, and present the 
research questions. The chapter will further identify a description of study terms, 
highlight the significance of the study, and disclose the process to accomplish the goals 
of the study. 
Statement of the Problem 
The responsibilities of board members in both corporations and higher education 
include financial oversight in addition to the realms of risk management, integrity, and 
accountability (Oxholm, 2005). There is limited academic research available on corporate 
and academic board governance. Modern day corporate governance is often described in 
literature as evolving from an effort to protect shareholder interests, as the growth of 
corporations in the nineteenth century increased the number of shareholder investors 
(Wells, 2010).  
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Academic governance can be traced to colonial America when early colleges 
drew from English common law tradition with states granting charters to higher 
education institutions establishing the organizations as public entities. Early academic 
governing boards were often populated with state political leaders (Bastedo, 2009). This 
arrangement was challenged in 1815, when the president of Dartmouth College attempted 
to preempt his board of trustees by altering the college charter to expand the size of the 
board from four to 21, in order to convene a self-interested majority of trustees. In the 
landmark case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) the original trustees sought 
prevention of the adoption of the new charter. The Supreme Court ruled the original 
charter was a contract between the state and the trustees, and it could not be altered 
without mutual agreement (Bastedo). The case stands as an example of trustee autonomy 
in higher education. Today, private colleges and universities are chartered by states, but 
governed as directed by the organizations’ bylaws (Bastedo). 
Over the years, corporate board governance evolved into a highly government 
regulated model, while academic board governance remained unregulated and less formal 
despite comparable levels of oversight duties (Hambrick et al., 2008). Jackson, Davis, 
and Jackson (2010) described the structure of the six regional associations of higher 
education accreditation in the United States, which share common accreditation 
compliance standards. Regional accrediting associations hold academic governing boards 
accountable for certain aspects of institutional operations in addition to rigorous 
academic standards for granting degrees. According to the Higher Learning Commission 
of the North Central Association (2013), the Commission accredits an educational 
institution itself, but not the entity owner of the institution. Higher education 
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commissions do not regulate academic board structure and responsibilities (Jackson et 
al.). The Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (2010) 
acknowledged a lack of government regulation in academic governance: 
America’s public and private institutions also depend on government, but they 
historically have been accorded autonomy in carrying out their educational 
functions through the medium of independent governing boards, working 
collaboratively with presidents, senior administrators and faculty leaders. (p. 1) 
This study examined insiders’ views of the experiences of corporate and academic 
board members in order to contribute to the body of literature with a qualitative 
descriptive case study of board governance.  
The purpose of the study was to gain knowledge of the organizational dynamics 
of board governance typically conducted in closed sessions. This study aimed to add to 
the body of knowledge on board governance. 
Background 
Corporate governance launched into public scrutiny due to scandals and 
malfeasances, which contributed to the financial collapse of organizations such as Enron 
in 2001, and WorldCom in 2002 (Smith, 2007). In response to public demand for 
government intervention and protection, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, a Democrat from 
Maryland and Congressman Michael G. Oxley, a Republican from Ohio, introduced 
legislation to mitigate risk for citizens who invest in publicly held corporations (Oxholm, 
2005). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) was passed by Congress, “To protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws, and for other purposes” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). According to Oxholm, 
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Sarbanes-Oxley does not rest with imposing new requirements on a corporation’s 
management and giving new powers to government prosecutors to enforce 
compliance. Instead, it totally rewrote the obligations of those who are in a good 
position (if not the best) to check up on management: the board of directors and 
the external (independent) auditors. The Act now puts them at personal risk if a 
corporation under their review misrepresents its financial condition or otherwise 
violates the disclosure laws. (p. 364) 
The Act does not pertain to non-profit organizations. 
 
The financial failures of Enron and WorldCom resulted in board directors’ 
fraudulent liability for Enron board members of $168 million of which $13 million was 
passed on as personal board member liability. In the case of WorldCom, directors’ 
fraudulent liability totaled $36 million of which $18 million was passed on as personal 
board member liability. The financial liability assessed to board members generated 
heightened interest in the roles and responsibilities of corporate boards (Adams et al., 
2010). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) further required the Audit Committee be 
composed of outside directors of the board, as well as requiring the chief executive 
officer and the chief financial officer certify their organization’s financial statements 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
Traditionally, corporate and academic governing boards meet privately without 
the opportunity for direct observation. The private setting of board meetings contributes 
to the perceptual lack of understanding of the roles and responsibilities of corporate and 
academic board members. Gee (2006), in discussing the convergence of corporate and 
academic governance practices suggested, “We need to recognize the basic differences 
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between the two sectors in order to understand what constitutes ‘best practices’ for both” 
(p. 26).  
Academic board governance in private colleges and universities is a non-regulated 
organizational construct serving the public interests in higher education. With 
responsibilities equivalent to their corporate counterparts, academic boards also have 
oversight duties in a principal agent dynamic (Bastedo, 2009). Academic board 
governance lacks government regulations to monitor ethical behavior and the formal 
oversight and personal liability required of corporate boards.  
According to Goins, Giacomino, and Akers (2009), there is evidence that a 
number of universities and colleges have voluntarily adopted best practices from the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Based on a survey of 100 college and university audit 
directors, the researchers revealed a disparity existed among private and public 
universities in the area related to external audit services. The data revealed that private 
universities showed a greater degree of implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley practices. 
Corporate board members are sought out to serve on academic boards for their 
business acumen and their ability to financially support the institution (Bastedo, 2009). 
Individuals serving on both corporate and academic governance boards provide an 
opportunity for formal, regulated governance practices to be introduced to academic 
governance (Oxholm, 2005). One method of gaining insights to the board governance 
dynamic is to conduct individual interviews to garner perceptions of participants’ 
experiences. It is unknown how academic governance is, will be, or should be influenced 
by the exposure of regulated governance practices being introduced to the non-regulated 
academic governance environment. 
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This study focused on gathering perceptions of corporate chief executive officers 
who also serve as trustees in private colleges and universities to determine how they 
describe their experiences of serving within the two governance models. The study 
analyzed how corporate governance requirements or behaviors influence private college 
and university board governance.  
A lack of academic research on both corporate and academic board governance is 
acknowledged in current literature. Studies such as Ning, Davidson, and Wang (2010) 
examined optimal corporate board size as a function of firm value, while Jiraporn, Singh, 
and Lee’s (2009) research focused on corporate governance effectiveness in relation to 
the number of board committees each director was assigned. The quantitative studies 
relied on empirical data available in public databases, such as the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center and corporate proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Pusser, Slaughter, and Thomas (2006) looked into forms of 
organizational networks on academic governing boards based on director interlock 
relationships published in public databases. These studies did not include perspectives 
from the board members themselves. 
There is a lack of corporate governance research focusing on the experiences 
described by board members from within this bound group. This qualitative descriptive 
case study supplied new information on board governance by gaining insights to 
document best practices in corporate and academic board governance functions, while 
introducing the potential for a future field of academic research. 
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Research Questions 
 This study gathered perspectives of chief executive officers who served on 
academic boards, and the study addressed the following research questions: 
1. How do chief executive officers who serve on both corporate and academic boards 
describe their experiences comparing the two governance models in terms of decision-
making efficiency, personal and professional rewards, and commitment to the mission of 
the organizations?  
2. How do chief executive officers perceive corporate board governance influences 
academic board governance? 
Description of Terms 
Board Governance. Derived from Latin term Gubernatus, “to steer” or “to give 
direction,” described the oversight responsibilities of a leadership group (Cornforth, 
2012, p. 1121). 
Coding. The action of identifying a passage or text that exemplifies an idea or 
concept (Gibbs, 2007). 
Corporate board. Corporate board members are individuals elected by vote of 
shareholders of the corporation for specific terms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1815). A court case filed by trustees of the 
college against the president of Dartmouth College who attempted to increase the number 
of board trustees in defiance of the state charter. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
trustees (Bastedo, 2009). 
Elite interview. An interview with a person or persons who are leaders or experts 
in a community or in powerful positions (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
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Enron. A firm that was located in Texas accused of fraudulent accounting 
practices in 2001, and became the impetus for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (Smith, 
2007). 
Gatekeeper. People regulating formally or informally the access to a research 
field (Flick, 2007a). 
Informed Consent. Participants in a study are informed that they are studied and 
given the chance to say no to the research (Flick, 2007a). 
Insider. Officers, directors and principals of firms who own company stock 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). 
Sine qua non. A French language term describing prolonged engagement in site-
based fieldwork in ethnography research for exposure to a group’s natural setting (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2013). 
Private Academic Board. Members charged with oversight of the academic 
organization by approval of the existing board (Bastedo, 2009). 
Public Academic Board. Members charged with oversight of the academic 
organization usually by governor appointment (Bastedo, 2009). 
Publicly held companies. Firms listed on exchanges where the ownership of the 
firm is controlled by shareholders (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Act was signed by President George W. Bush 
on July 30, 2002, contained reforms designed to change corporate governance in publicly 
held corporations (Smith, 2007). 
Security and Exchange Commission. The United States Government agency 
authorized to enforce the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). 
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Significance of the Study 
The qualitative methodology was used to gather impressions on the dynamics of 
board governance, usually conducted behind closed doors (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The 
qualitative study was comprised of interviews, observations, and comparative research 
with members of a specific group of chief executive officers who are not often available 
to contribute directly to academic research. These design tools supported the purpose of 
the study, which was to gather impressions of the how corporate board members describe 
their experiences serving on both corporate and academic boards in order to add to the 
body of knowledge on board governance.  
According to Robson (2011), interviews are usually written in a literary style, 
which can be an advantage to researchers with a non-scientific background. In an 
environment that does not lend itself to observation, interviews provide authentic 
impressions of board governance experiences, as a method of responding to the research 
questions.  
The population for the study was a purposive sample of governance participants 
comprised of chief executives officers of organizations who served as members of both 
corporate and academic boards of private colleges and universities. The sample size was 
11 chief executive officers who were interviewed to gain their perspectives and 
experiences of their dual director and trustee roles. The study participants represented a 
diverse population in terms of gender and race. The chief executive officers represented 
six academic institutions located in the Midwest and Eastern geographic areas of the 
United States. The researcher had the opportunity for direct observation in the role of a 
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professional board governance administrator at a private university located in a major city 
in the Midwest of the United States of America. 
Process to Accomplish 
The qualitative case study method is suitable when the research seeks to respond 
to a descriptive question (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2012). This case study relied on the 
components of individual interviews and direct observation, which examined the 
experiences of board members in order to gather insights on the dynamics of corporate 
and academic board governance. As Creswell (2013) noted, case study research approach 
investigates a bounded system, as it is happening, in order to interpret the experiences in 
order to make them known to outsiders.  
Salkind (2012) noted that qualitative research was a unique opportunity to seek 
knowledge on social and behavioral science. As a design tool, interviews allow data 
collection in a broad experiential scope compared to the narrow environment required 
when research is designed for a specific hypothesis (Letendre, 2004). The interviews 
gathered a broad body of knowledge from insiders of a purposive sample group of 
individuals who served as chief executive officers on corporate boards and academic 
trustees. In describing interviewing as a method for gathering qualitative data, Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009) noted an “inter-view” as an “inter-change” of views between two 
people about a topic of mutual interest rooted in conversations of daily life (p. 2). 
The purposive sample size was 11 chief executive officers who Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009) labeled elite interview candidates due to their prominent roles in the 
business community. The researcher sought approval from the host University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), as the study relied on human subjects. The researcher 
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ensured that validated and ethical procedures were observed. The researcher solicited the 
support of the president and the board chairman of a university located in a major city in 
the Midwest of the United States of America to act as what Flick (2007b) referred to as 
gatekeepers who can open doors to the field to find the right people to interview. The 
gatekeepers provided introductions to some subjects for participation in the study, while 
other subjects were associates of the researcher. The researcher contacted the participants 
by telephone and by electronic email to arrange to meet with the chief executive officers 
who agreed to participate in the study. All participants were mailed a letter approved by 
the IRB Committee of the host University to formally seek their participation in the 
academic study. The participants were not paid, and the researcher obtained informed 
written consent from the adult participants, as representatives of their corporate 
organizations. 
The researcher had two decades of board governance sine qua non or 
indispensable observation exposure, which Leedy and Ormrod (2013) referred to as a 
useful cultural component in qualitative research. The researcher’s direct observations 
and familiarity with board governance was useful, as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) noted 
that interviews with elites require the researcher to be knowledgeable about the topic, as 
well as being a master of the technical language. Elites are comfortable being 
interviewed, and the researcher had to be cautious of subjects exchanging prepared 
viewpoints instead of new insights.  
The procedures for the semi-structured interview protocol included scheduling 
one-hour person-to-person interviews that were digitally recorded for transcription. The 
interviews were conducted within a 45-minute period of time, allowing for a wrap-up 
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session that did not exceed an interval of one hour. All interviews were conducted during 
consistent allotted time parameters. The subjects were asked the same set of semi-
structured interview questions to provide a methodical opportunity to gather responses. 
Before conducting the interviews, the interview questions were piloted by three board 
governance experts to validate authenticity.  
The interviews were digitally recorded for a thorough, replicated data collection 
process. The interviews were scheduled and conducted over a one-year period 
commencing in June 2013. The process is further discussed in the qualitative research 
methods section.  
The qualitative descriptive case study explored the following research questions: 
1. How do chief executive officers who serve on corporate and academic boards describe 
their experiences comparing the two governance models in terms of decision-making 
efficiency, personal and professional reward, and commitment to the mission of the 
organizations? Examples of the semi-structured interview questions are described in 
Appendix A. 
2. How do chief executive officers perceive corporate board governance influences 
academic board governance? Examples of open-ended questions are described in 
Appendix B. 
The researcher transcribed the entire interview, as Creswell (2013) suggested that 
interviews require the voice of participants to speak for themselves, while associating the 
author’s preconceived ideas measured against the actual feedback (Salkind, 2012). Gibbs 
(2007) recommended the researcher transcribe the interviews using a transcription 
machine or by digitizing the recorded interview as an acceptable alternative method. 
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Transcription methods are helpful for discourse analysis or conversation analysis by 
allowing the researcher to listen for common themes that may be missed by computer 
generated transcription software.  
Gibbs (2007) suggested software known as computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis (CAQDAS) to analyze qualitative data contained in transcripts. Several 
commercial applications available were: ATLAS.ti, MAXqda, NVivo, and Nud.ist, which 
have useful search functions, as well as the ability to import and edit rich text files 
capable of coding down to a single word search. The repetition of code words can lead to 
common themes analysis. The transcripts were analyzed by categorizing data into 
common themes with CAQDAS software and researcher interpretation. 
Gibbs (2007) acknowledged the use of software in qualitative analysis, referred to 
as theory builders, can provide researchers with the tools to develop and test theories. A 
potential caution to the use of CAQDAS was pointed out that researchers could become 
distant from the words of the respondents. Accordingly, Flick (2007a) acknowledged that 
writing has a critical role in qualitative research, “Writing is about research and the 
procedures used in it becomes an important instrument for conveying what was done in 
the project, how it was done and how well it was done” (p. 139). The researcher’s 
training in professional writing was utilized in the transcription phase of the qualitative 
descriptive study. 
With respect to the ethical aspects of the study, the researcher protected the 
anonymity of participants by using pseudonym names to maintain confidentiality, as 
Flick (2007b) suggested. During interviews, research questions addressed personal 
experiences and the researcher had an obligation to maintain the privacy of the 
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interviewees. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) noted that ethical issues evolved throughout 
the research process and should be considered an important element in the interview 
protocol. Some of the phases where potential ethical concerns should be monitored were: 
during the interview situation, which can be stressful for the subjects; in the transcription 
phase, which required the research to be loyal to the subject’s statements; and, in the 
analysis phase, which necessitated being true to the words of the subjects. In order to 
reduce interviewer bias, the researcher must refrain from social cues indicating approval 
or disapproval of participants’ responses (Salkind, 2012). 
Summary 
The researcher proposed to examine how corporate governance requirements 
influence private colleges and universities governance practices by gathering the 
perspectives of CEOs serving as academic trustees. The researcher conducted a 
qualitative descriptive case study, which included semi-structured interviews and direct 
observation for data collection. The interviews were conducted with chief executive 
officers who served on both corporate and academic boards to garner their perspectives 
on the experiences of serving on the two governance models. The research themes 
evolved from a review of current literature, as detailed in the following chapter, as well 
as the data detailed in the methodology discussion.  
Despite the lack of academic research on corporate and academic research from 
an insider’s viewpoint, a review of current literature broadens the context of the dynamics 
of board governance, as a backdrop to the research. The following chapter further 
supports the social relevance this qualitative descriptive case study offers to the 
Academy.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The focus of research, studies, and articles on board governance differs between 
corporate and academic board governance. Corporate board governance research is 
embedded in discussions related to firms’ financial performance and accountability to 
shareholders. These topics are not relevant to academic board governance. Academic 
governance research tends to focus on trustee qualifications and their level of institutional 
knowledge. This study expanded the focus of governance research by incorporating the 
words and opinions of the participants themselves who served on both corporate and 
academic boards, as a method of bridging a gap in academic research. Stone and 
Ostrower (2007) contended that governance models exist in most organizations, whole 
societies, and communities. Carver (2010) described governance as a worldwide 
phenomenon found when individuals working on behalf of others exercise authority and 
accountability over enterprises such as corporations, non-government organizations 
(NGOs), governments, and non-profit organizations.  
According to Rytmeister (2009), university governance was a unique form of 
corporate governance with many similar structures to corporate governance. Universities 
were complex institutions in terms of accountabilities to internal constituencies and 
external stakeholders. In lieu of shareholders in the corporate spectrum, universities have 
many stakeholder groups such as students, faculty, staff, community members, and 
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governmental groups. The author acknowledged a deficiency of empirical research on 
academic governance (Rytmeister). 
Adams et al. (2010) observed that much of the research on corporate board 
governance focused on board member selection and board decision processes. Their 
research looked at a body of literature concluding that corporate research falls within 
three categories: board member selection, firm performance, and board actions. The study 
uncovered several descriptive surveys that reflected directors’ responsibilities, 
assessment, bargaining power, chief executive officer control, and attributes of the roles 
and responsibilities of board members. However, the researchers did not report locating 
descriptive research containing interviews with the elites, in their own words, such as this 
descriptive case study.  
In addition to the lack of corporate and academic research on governance, the 
book-publishing arena also witnessed a gap of governance literature as uncovered by 
Chait, Ryan, and Taylor (2005) in a 2003 search of the database of book retailer Barnes 
& Noble. The authors noted there were 27,220 books on leadership, in contrast to 2,349 
books with the keyword of governance. This represented a ratio of 12 to 1. 
This qualitative descriptive case study aimed to compare and contrast the two 
governance structures of corporate governance and academic governance by exposing 
shared characteristics, unique delineations, and the intersection of best practices from 
both governance traditions. The study relied on interviews conducted with chief 
executive officers serving as academic trustees to provide first-hand knowledge on their 
perceptions of the two governance models of corporate and academic governance. 
Chapter II concentrates on current literature related to the topics of: Chief Executive 
17 
 
Officers as Governance Participants, Board Governance Characteristics and Distinctions, 
Board Governance Discourse, and summarizes the discussion with a Conclusion. The 
chapter commences with The Work of Governance Boards. 
The Work of Governance Boards 
Historical Context. 
The term governance originated from the Latin word gubernatus meaning to steer, 
give direction, or manage (Harrison, Murray & Cornforth, 2012). According to Stone and 
Ostrower (2007), during the past 25 years, there was political pressure to reduce the 
government’s scope and to shift responsibilities for public policy governance 
implementation to nongovernmental entities. The researchers affirmed the boundaries 
between nonprofit governance and public governance were increasingly fluid and 
overlapping suggesting that research on governance must develop to encompass the two 
relationships. The authors asserted that drawing on two dissimilar governance structures 
could strengthen each interpretation, which was the breadth and depth of this research. 
A common definition of modern-day academic governance has been described as 
one of deference to the academic authority of the organization (Balch, 2008). According 
to Balch, this position contrasted to trustees’ roles in the past, when trustees believed they 
had a responsibility to override the academic leadership when necessary. The author 
contended that unlike corporate boards, where the governance body and leadership strive 
toward mutual understanding, academic governance has developed a governance model 
of parallel paths among trustees and leadership. 
 A study by Adams and Ferreira (2007) defined the role of corporate directors as 
both advisors and monitors of management. The hypothesis tested the dual responsibility 
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of independent directors and their relationship with the chief executive of the 
organization. The purpose of the research was to determine whether the chief executive 
should reveal too much or too little information to the directors, when the chief 
executives’ goals were centered on creating a friendly relationship with board members. 
The researchers determined that the approach of sharing too little information 
between the chief executive officer and independent directors allowed for potential 
conflicts of interest among independent directors. The data inferred that when there was a 
friendly relationship between the directors and the chief executive officer, higher quality 
advice was given to the chief executive officer, thus protecting shareholder value, which 
was considered a primary objective of corporate board effectiveness. Chait et al. (2005) 
discussed the valuable and meaningful characteristics of the work on non-profit boards 
through this visual framework. 
Table 1 
 
Valuable and Meaningful Work of Nonprofit Boards 
 
Actual Work Valuable Work Meaningful Work 
 
Attending board and 
committee meetings 
Working on and completing 
the capital campaign 
Interacting with constituents 
 
 
Authorizing a capital 
campaign 
 
Hiring a new CEO 
Hiring a new CEO Identifying and working to 
solve really important issues 
like how we’re going to 
increase participation in our 
programs 
 
  Annual retreat, were we 
discuss the issues we should 
be working on to advance the 
organization 
Note. Adapted from Governance as Leadership: Reframing the Work of Nonprofit 
Boards by R. P. Chait, W. P. Ryan, and B. E. Taylor, 2005, p. 172. Copyright 2005 by 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Reprinted with permission. 
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In further defining the roles and responsibilities of governing boards, Chait et al., defined 
three responsibilities of governance leadership as fiduciary or stewardship of assets; 
strategic or the partnership with management; and, generative defined as the ability to 
add value to the organization. 
 
 
Figure 1. Three primary responsibilities of governance boards. Adapted from 
Governance as Leadership, by R. P. Chait, W. P. Ryan, and B. E Taylor, 2005, p. 7. 
Copyright 2005 by BoardSource, Inc., John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: Hoboken, NJ. Reprinted 
with permission. 
In a similar vein, Carver (2010) conceptualized the notion of global governance 
theory as a theoretical basis for future research. The theory’s range concentrated on: The 
purpose of boards; the irreducible minimum elements of accountability among varied 
governance venues; and, the concepts and principles that would enable those 
characteristics to be optimized. 
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Carver (2010) maintained that current literature focused on the components of 
governance tasks, in contrast to global governance theory, which was larger in scope and 
more rigorous and foundational than the traditional subordinate topics. Global 
governance theory promoted use of a common governance language and terminology, 
and it sought to improve the public perception of corporate board members to be viewed 
as competent, ethical, and accountable stewards. 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) as Governance Participants 
 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are favorably sought out to serve on governance 
boards. Larcker and Tayan (2011) pointed out that CEO-level experience was the single 
most important factor in recruiting new corporate directors according to the National 
Association of Corporate Directors 2009 survey of public companies. The authors 
ascertained that interlock relationships among CEOs account for the common practice of 
CEOs of blue chip companies serving on other equally prominent corporate boards. The 
researchers provided the example of the CEO of Archer Daniels Midland also served on 
the board of Proctor and Gamble. There is growing interest in academic literature on the 
CEO directorships examining the use of social power; impact on firm performance; and 
interlocking relationships to name a few (Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2008; Adams et al., 
2010; and, Pusser et al., 2006).  
According to Fahlenbrach et al. (2008) the appointment of outside CEOs to 
corporate boards allowed firms the opportunity to advance their own reputation and to 
signal to stock market observers that the firms were doing well. Their research indicated 
that CEOs were more likely to join boards that already have sitting CEOs as members, 
which supported a prestige factor that directorships that provide financial and networking 
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benefits were most attractive. This view was consistent with research conducted by Stern 
and Westphal (2010), which determined that board appointments were markers of success 
among the corporate elite members. The authors pointed out that there were ingratiatory 
behaviors that were more likely to yield board appointments. The researchers defined two 
forms of ingratiatory behaviors: flattery and opinion conformity. These were attributes 
that CEOs tap into when seeking outside board appointments, as well as being exposed to 
when selecting directors to their corporate boards (Stern & Westphal). 
In a deeper examination into the role of CEOs in governance, research conducted 
by Harrison et al. (2012) suggested that there was a tendency to view CEOs in a positive 
light simply because of the luster of the role of CEO, irrespective of the specific 
individual. However, their study suggested that only respondents who believed their 
CEOs possessed competencies in specific leadership qualities viewed them as having 
high impact on the nonprofit sector organizations they served. Their study implied that 
the perceptions of the followers in nonprofit organizations were worthy of future research 
in determining the characteristics of leadership within organizations. This research study 
focused on the perspectives of CEOs, as an elite group, well versed in governance 
practices. 
Board Responsibilities 
There have been recent academic governance scandals. An example is the 
controversy at the University of Virginia, when the board fired and rehired the same 
university president within a three-month period in 2012 (Stripling, 2013). This academic 
governance scandal demonstrated disconnected perceptions between academic boards 
and university management at a prominent university. Balch (2008) asserted that trustees 
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have an important role as mediators and leaders in the academic community. Balch’s 
qualitative study on academic governance resulted in a recommendation that trustees 
interject more corporate-like governance attributes to academic governance in order to 
professionalize governance. Balch’s recommendations supported the research goals of 
this dissertation in terms of gaining new information by soliciting the perceptions of chief 
executives officers serving on corporate and academic boards. 
Brown’s (2011) research supported Balch’s (2008) call for professionalizing 
academic governance by determining whether the academic governance system was 
flawed or whether it was the best system of governance for universities based on systems 
adopted in the United Kingdom. Brown’s research detailed some of the challenges and 
weaknesses with the current academic governance model detailed in previous research. 
Brown’s conclusion that universities and colleges were moving toward private sector 
governance models in terms of accountability was supported by the observation that 
policy makers in the United States were attempting to hold leaders accountable as 
organizations focused on promoting efficiencies and effectiveness. Brown emphasized 
that major reconstruction and reform of academic governance structures were needed to 
parallel the corporate sector. 
Feyerherm (2009) provided a contrary perspective to both Balch (2008) and 
Brown (2011) that examined the university senate model as compared to academic 
unions, and to the relationship between academic boards and academic leadership. 
Feyerherm acknowledged that as universities have grown in complexity, competing 
demands within institutions have evolved into a business-minded approach to 
governance.  According to Feyerherm, academic governance was not analogous to 
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corporate governance, as academic governance required co-learning and co-creating, 
compared to corporate governance’s focus on fiduciary oversight and shareholder value. 
Feyerherm claimed that the collaborative model required in academic governance was a 
departure from the traditional top-down business leadership model. Feyerherm concluded 
that this distinction required for the academic governance model was dissimilar to the 
corporate governance model. 
Board Governance Characteristics and Distinctions 
Academic and Corporate Attributes. 
Kerr (2004) conducted a study with experts in governance, which exposed a rift 
between academia and corporate governance, based on the hypotheses that academics do 
not consider business publications as academic research and business executives do not 
consider academic research in their business decisions. Kerr recommended methods to 
bridge the gaps and sought to discover new data on board governance. Kerr suggested 
that further research should focus on: topics that were current and important to 
practitioners; academic studies should be conversant with theory and include research 
pertaining to topics of interest to practitioners; publication outlets should attempt to reach 
targeted audiences; and, business managers and executives should be influenced by 
academic research. 
Adams et al. (2010) presented descriptions of various surveys related to corporate 
governance and concluded that robust research was still needed to provide empirical data 
linking the determinants of boards and their monitoring structures. The researchers did 
not uncover research linkage to board member perceptions comparing corporate board 
service and academic board service or qualitative descriptive research from the 
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participants themselves, which was the objective of this study. The researchers 
recommended future research opportunities should focus on exposing the relationship 
between strong board governance and the implications to business activities and board 
independence (Adams et al.).  
 Pusser et al. (2006) conducted an investigation of the interlock and indirect 
interlock relationships among academic trustees in research public universities and 
private universities in the United States.  
A variation of interlocks, indirect interlocks, occurs when directors of 
competing organizations serve together on a third board, as would be the 
case if a director of Oracle and a director of Intel served concurrently on 
the board of General Motors. (Pusser et al., p.749) 
Interlock relationships were viewed as beneficial to organizations in several ways: access 
to leadership skills; access to financial institutions; access to current business models; 
and, relationship building among members. 
The study relied on data collected by the National Science Foundation to 
determine the top 10 public and top 10 private institutions that received federal funds for 
research during the fiscal years 1999 to 2001. The researchers also looked at institutional 
records to identify the names of the board members of the 20 institutions (Pusser et al., 
2006). There were 662 board members identified, and the study cross-referenced those 
board members’ names against corporate proxy forms filed with the United States 
Security and Exchange Commission to identify members of corporate board of directors. 
They determined that of the 662 board members of academic institutions, 413 were 
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linked to corporate board positions with the potential of interlock relationships (Pusser et 
al.). 
The study segregated the data applicable to the public and private institutions and 
noted that governing board members at public institutions have fewer members than 
private institutions (Pusser et al., 2006). The study suggested that the potential of finding 
interlock relationships increased with the size of the boards, thus putting public 
institutions at a disadvantage for interlock relationships over private institutions. The 
research revealed that the boards of private institutions were considerably more 
interconnected than boards of public institutions, and the private institutions had more 
interlock relationships with members of corporate board members of Fortune 1,000 
organizations with expertise in leadership and decision-making skills (Pusser et al.). 
Based on the data, it was determined that the size of academic governing boards 
influences the potential for interlock relationships (Pusser et al., 2006). Another 
conclusion of the study was that public academic boards have fewer interlock 
relationships due in part to the fact the board members were often appointed by state 
governors, compared to private institutions with a more robust pool of candidates from a 
variety of sources including other board members. One limitation of the research was the 
sample size consisting of the largest research-funded institutions whose prominent 
reputation rendered them attractive to corporate board members implying a potential bias.  
Bowen (2008) suggested that the structure and function of corporate boards 
improved over the decade from 1998-2008. The research study identified the key 
components required to strengthen board governance. According to Bowen, the annual 
Spencer Stuart Board Index provided a source for gathering empirical data on board 
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engagement, representation, and director balance of power. The recommendations for 
strengthening board governance were: understanding board partnership; recruiting board 
members for effective leadership; investment of time and resources for good governance; 
distinguishing nonprofit and for-profit board governance convergence; and, recognizing 
the rewards of board governance in both sectors. Due to pressure from activist 
shareholders, organizations have adopted oversight policies that strengthen governance 
roles. Bowen noted that the power of the executive leader required clear definition to 
improve collaboration with nonprofit board members. Building constructive partnerships 
was recommended for both the corporate and non-profit governance sectors.  
Dobbins, Knill, and Vogtle (2011) developed a statistical framework to record 
higher education governance changes in Europe. Driven by pressure from the European 
Commission, economic, and social demands, higher education has undergone many 
changes over the years. They proposed a classification of empirical indicators in this field 
based on three historical higher education models: academic self-governance, state-
centered model of governance, and the market-oriented model of higher education. 
Within the three models, the researchers considered specific industry indicators such as: 
balance of power, financial governance, personnel autonomy, and substantive governance 
matters in order to provide data for future researchers to trace patterns of change in 
academic governance.  
Cultural Implications 
Baird’s (2006) research focused on developing an academic board culture to 
improve the quality of their governance outcomes.  Baird acknowledged that excellent 
board governance was a difficult task that required trust, knowledge, and commitment, as 
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well as the finesse to ask probing questions without challenging the authority of the chief 
executive officer of the academic institution. According to Baird, some literature 
suggested that corporate boards required a fitness test of board members, as they were 
charged with being effective in their board work. Baird acknowledged that academic 
boards do not require a similar expertise level of their board members primarily due to a 
lack of accountability as compared to corporate board members.  
Effective academic board members were likely to endorse professional practices 
such as orientation and ongoing development of board members, reviewing the CEOs 
performance, and succession planning, as well as reviewing board members performance. 
Baird (2006) noted that the definition of an effective board was one that addressed the 
value-based and political dimension of the institution. Academic institutions were 
charged with serving both a public good and the development of productive citizenry 
requiring a business-like approach to governance rooted in accountability. Baird referred 
to the proposed model as the professionalization of university governing boards. 
An Australian model of university governance monitoring was established in 
2002, by implementation of an external audit conducted by the Australian Universities 
Quality Agency. The government agency monitored universities against their stated 
mission and objectives to determine the level of professional practices. The intervention 
used a business-model approach, which departed from the norms of Australian academic 
institutions.  
Baird (2006) recommended several processes for enhancing university 
governance culture, such as:  
• Acknowledgement of competing viewpoints in difficult decisions 
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• Identification of viewpoints held by each board member on the effective role of 
board governance 
• Consideration of differing values on the strategic direction of the institution 
• Commitment to design governance practices that include community members’ 
engagement and celebrate the institutions academic tradition and core values 
• Reflection by board members on research literature related to accountability and 
board governance  
According to Rytmeister (2009), universities lacked the management processes for 
strategic and directional planning required for the increased competition for students, 
staff, and resources. The author noted that increased tension developed in role 
perceptions and practices when there were deficiencies in the defined role of management 
and the role of governance. The governance-management interface required for strategic 
discussions and planning can create tensions and pressures not conducive to effective 
governance. Based on a study conducted with Australian academic governing boards, 
Rytmeister studied board sizes ranging between 15 to 22 members considered a mixed 
stakeholder-expertise model of ex-officio, appointed, and elected members.  
Relying on grounded theory research approach, Rytmeister (2009) asserted that the 
relationship between management and governance was considered assumed rather than 
examined. The author recognized that there were limited guidelines and protocols to 
ensure good practice and standards of performance specific to academic board 
governance and in defining board strategic roles. The study featured a cultural approach 
including interviews and observations. The triangulated data consisted of semi-structured 
interviews of 36 governing board members, with follow-up interviews taking place one 
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year later and through direct observations of governing board meetings in six institutions.  
The research revealed that board members with financial and commercial experience 
reflected a deeper understanding of governance, as well as understanding the boundary 
between governance and management. In terms of strategic planning, survey respondents 
considered it within the realm of management by handing off the final approval to the 
board viewed as a passive role. This data directly contrasted to the Governance 
Leadership Model proposed by Chait et al. (2005) defined as board responsibilities 
requiring fiduciary, strategic, and generative accountabilities. 
Related to developing board culture, Rytmeister (2009) noted that board 
empowerment and engagement could be utilized when there was greater involvement in 
strategic planning. The research pointed out that board and executive team one- or two-
day retreats were helpful for developing understanding and trust between both member 
groups. According to respondents, retreats were considered vital for learning about the 
university, and its operating environment. Strategic planning topics were rarely addressed 
at regular board meetings, where topics centered on tuition and fees, building approvals, 
offshore campuses, rankings, and policy changes over the course of a typical meeting 
cycle (Rytmeister). 
Rytmeister’s (2009) study indicated that board retreats were rituals within a layer of 
behaviors that take on symbolic meaning. The research signaled that board membership 
was classified by certain member attributes, such as expertise (knowledge or profession), 
experience (university or other organizations), values (collegial or corporate), educational 
background (area of discipline), power and influence within the board (proximity to the 
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chief executive officer), and power and influence outside the board (networks and 
connections). 
In terms of cultural expertise, participants stated that strategy was one of the main 
responsibilities of the board, and they considered the knowledge and expertise of others, 
and themselves, as foundational to the process. These insights were consistent to the 
research of Larcker and Tayan (2011), which pointed out that CEO-level experience, was 
the most important factor in recruiting new corporate directors. Rytmeister’s (2009) 
research indicated that there were many similarities between corporate and academic 
governance; however, he acknowledged academic governance involved additional layers 
of complexity. According to the research, successful governance required making full use 
of the expertise of the governing body members in a culture of trust, understanding, and 
input from diverse social groups, which were identified as challenges for governance 
groups. These observations were consistent with Migliore’s (2012) study that concluded 
that trust among board members was essential for collaboration, innovative change, and 
academic excellence.  
Migliore (2012) pointed out that a collaborative environment encouraged shared 
leadership at all levels of the institution. The researcher asserted that boards have dual 
responsibilities as fiduciaries and to effectively allocate resources to achieve an 
organization’s mission. Migliore offered this definition, “[. . .] trust is the positive 
expectation that another’s motives, behaviors, and competence levels will produce 
positive outcomes” (p.31). Trusting relationships were important in order to have 
meaningful boardroom discussions about data trends and making improvement decisions. 
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Board Governance Discourse 
Behind Closed Doors. 
Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009) studied the perception of corporate 
board decisions taking place behind closed doors in a black box. Board meetings were 
physically held behind closed doors, and it was not apparent to those outside the inner 
workings of this group dynamic what transpired behind the closed doors. The authors 
concluded that much of the literature on board governance has created a black box around 
board vigilance, consequently creating a rich environment for further research on what 
boards do and how board members were selected. This study addressed both concerns by 
gathering the perspectives of board members themselves. 
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Figure 2. Flow chart of board and corporate leadership input and decisions. Adapted 
from Strategic Leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams, 
and boards, by S. Finkelstein, D. C. Hambrick, and A. A. Canella, Jr., 2009, p. 228. 
Copyright 2009 by Oxford University Press, Inc.: New York, NY. Adapted with 
permission. 
Chait et al. (2005) described the black box phenomenon as, “We can see and 
appreciate what it produces, but we have little sense of how the work actually gets done. 
In some cases, there seems to be little point in trying to understand it” (p. 82). The work 
of corporate governance boards and private university academic boards takes place 
behind closed doors without the opportunity for direct observation in an environment 
perceived as working from within a black box. This descriptive qualitative case study is 
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an opportunity to hear from the participants themselves on their perspectives of the inner-
workings of the corporate and academic boards they serve. 
Beyond the black box phenomenon, other research looked at governance 
framework such as a study conducted by Hambrick et al. (2008). The researchers 
acknowledged that corporate governance concerns were cross-functional areas within 
finance, management, and organizational behaviors of firms. The authors’ focused on a 
framework concentrated in the specialties of economics and law considered as both a 
micro viewpoint from the internal view of the organization and a macro viewpoint from 
the public purview outside the organization.  
Their research exposed a different perspective than the frequently discussed 
principal-agent model between shareholders and management by considering the impact 
of corporate governance and its relevance in the context of broader society (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2007). Hambrick et al.’s (2008) research addressed allegations that corporate 
governance issues related to concerns within organizations, as well as to labor leaders, 
investors, politicians, and regulatory bodies outside organizations. This viewpoint was 
consistent with Stone and Ostrower’s (2007) assertion that governance models exist in 
many social dynamics, and they have an overarching impact on society. 
The seminal research conducted by Michael, Schwartz, Cook, and Winston 
(1999) explored academic trustee satisfaction deemed dependent on individual 
motivation and persuasion, since trustee positions were voluntary. The study concentrated 
on determining elements of satisfaction and on strategies of improving satisfaction in 
private and public higher education institutions in the United States. Composed of a 
written survey of 500 trustees, the data were analyzed to determine if gender bias and 
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level of education factored into trustees’ responses. The research uncovered distinctions 
between gender groups, yet noted that the level of a trustees’ education did not appear to 
alter the outcome. The authors asserted that research on traditional job satisfaction does 
not apply to trustees, as their roles were performed on a voluntary basis and suggested 
that future researchers conduct in-depth interviews in order to gain insights not easily 
gained through questionnaires, such as the interviews conducted in this study. 
Board Effectiveness 
Board effectiveness describes an essential component for both corporate and 
academic boards in order to resolve issues, to endorse strategic direction, and to adopt 
policies. Finegold, Lawler, and Conger (2001) examined a hypothetical scenario of new 
chief executive officer, whose board of directors was not engaged at an appropriate level 
of board governance participation in order to determine what attributes were needed to 
build and to engage effective corporate boards of directors. The researchers concluded 
that the motivations for building more effective boards were: to gain strategic advice; to 
secure resources; to manage crises; to help develop leadership; and, to increase 
shareholder value. The researchers made suggestions for building an effective board, 
such as: define the board’s strategic priorities and mission; determine the boards talent 
needs; annually assess the chief executive officer and board members; remove ineffective 
board members; provide timely information to enable the board; allow time for the board 
to operate effectively; and, align director’s interests with the board’s mission.  
Letendre (2004) conducted a study on corporate boardroom dynamics and 
acknowledged that social science research on the topic was difficult to gather, because 
private board meetings did not allow the opportunity for direct observation, as previously 
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noted in the discussion on the inner-workings of the black box (Chait et al., 2005, 
Finkelstein et al., 2009,). The research consisted of interviews to gather data from board 
members on board effectiveness. Letendre’s research approach was similar to the 
methodology used in this descriptive case study consisting of interviews to gather data. 
Letendre discussed research gathered by Finegold et al. (2001), which looked at survey 
data compiled by the corporate board director placement firm, Korn/Ferry. According to 
the researchers, the Korn/Ferry survey represented data from directors in 1,000 firms in 
the United States. The research correlated board governance to corporate return on 
investment and determined that five attributes contributed to board effectiveness: 
knowledge, information, power, rewards, and opportunity/time (Finegold et al.). Letendre 
recommended three principles to optimize board effectiveness: board size should be 
determined by skills needed; meeting time should be adequate to discuss strategies; and, 
an annual self-assessment of board members should be conducted.  
In discussing board effectiveness, board size is a common research theme. For 
instance, Ning et al. (2010) study focused on determining the ideal number of members 
on corporate boards to optimize board effectiveness. Their data indicated that since the 
2002 Wall Street financial collapse boards with fewer members, ranging from seven or 
less, increased in size, while larger boards with 12 or more members, shrunk in size. The 
empirical study looked at the reversion trend in board size over time and suggested that 
board independence and staggered board structure may be linked to board size. The study 
sample of 473 firms was randomly selected from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices database, at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, along with data 
on board size listed in the proxy statements of publicly traded companies. The researchers 
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concluded that based on agency theory, there were costs when boards were too large, 
while resource dependency theory pointed out that larger boards were beneficial in 
providing access to more external resources (Ning et al.).  
Member Qualifications and Composition 
The member skill set and composition are critical considerations for both 
academic and corporate boards. Hopkins, O’Neil, and Williams (2007) examined a model 
for measuring emotional intelligence competencies through a self-assessment 
questionnaire of school board members by surveying current and former school board 
members in two urban areas in the United States. Emotional intelligence was described as 
the capacity to understand one’s own emotions and manage them effectively, as well as 
understanding the emotions of others (Hopkins et al.). The study analyzed the 
relationship between emotional intelligence competencies and effective board leadership 
using a theoretical model called the Emotional Competence Inventory. The data 
established that emotional intelligence was a critical factor for effective school boards in 
six core competencies: transparency, achievement, initiative, organizational awareness, 
conflict management, and teamwork and collaboration (Hopkins et al.). 
Supporting the work of Hopkins et al. (2007) the importance of context-specific 
board leadership qualifications, Dulewicz (2007) looked at assessing and developing 
corporate directors through the Leadership Dimensions Questionnaire (LDQ), which 
measured 15 leadership constructs to quantify the level of Emotional Intelligence (EI) 
among respondents. According to Dulewicz, high levels of EI benefit directors and some 
elements of EI can be developed and exploited.  
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In comparison to corporate board effectiveness, academic board composition was 
examined in research conducted by de Boer, Huisman, and Meister-Scheytt (2010) as 
they surveyed governance structures in universities in three European countries. The 
researchers gathered historical data on previous board structures, and the researchers 
acknowledged that board governance research was limited on university governing 
boards. The study looked at board composition, independence, accountability, and 
transparency within the governing boards of universities. The researchers utilized a 
comparative study approach to identify how boards were perceived, similarities and 
differences between the three countries, and the tensions boards face (de Boer et al.) 
The researchers identified tensions between the board and the universities’ top 
management and conformance and performance roles, described as attention to detail 
versus forward thinking strategic focus. The study revealed that women were 
underrepresented on boards in two of the three countries and, irrespective of gender, 
members from the private sector were overrepresented (de Boer et al.). The researchers 
pointed out that the tensions identified were visible in the governance structure of all 
three countries. The authors made recommendations for improving board governance. 
Based on the research, they suggested the number of board members could be increased 
to enlarge diversity representation, and they suggested that certification training for board 
members could compensate for a lack of knowledge in university governance. 
Consistent with the work of Adams and Ferreira (2007) research conducted by 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2007) examined corporate board composition in terms of size, 
structure, and behaviors related to company performance. Based on a sample of 7,000 
firms during the period of 1990 to 2004, listed in the Disclosures database of proxy 
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statements filed with the federal government. The study focused on associations between 
board structure, board size, and organizational behaviors. The study included a cross-
section of firms of various sizes, longevity, and industries focused on board size, board 
independence, and board leadership. The researchers concluded that determinants of 
board structure and composition vary between small and large firms and the data 
suggested that government regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), resulted 
in an increase in board size. This study contrasted to the work of Ning et al. (2010) that 
indicated a trend toward smaller boards. 
Government Regulation. 
According to data compiled by the Wilshire 5000 Index, as of September, 2014, 
there were 3,818 publicly traded companies in the USA (Waid, 2014). Under the purview 
of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), publicly traded companies were 
required to abide by rules and regulations that protect investors from fraudulent 
behaviors. In recent years, governance matters have entered the domain of the SEC, 
specifically with the introduction of legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). 
In the 2012 Annual Report issued by the SEC, the following text provided a 
summary of the remedy efforts the agency has accomplished: 
Since the financial crisis, the SEC has filed 80 financial crisis actions against 117 
individuals and entities, including 57 CEOs, CFOs, and other senior corporate 
officers. These enforcement actions have resulted in 36 individuals being barred 
from serving in the securities industry or as officers or directors at public 
companies as well as orders of more than $2.2 billion in disgorgement, penalties, 
and other financial relief, most of which has been or will be distributed to harmed 
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investors. In addition, 36 individuals have been barred from the securities 
industry, from serving as officers and directors of public companies, and/or from 
appearing or practicing before the Commission. (Security and Exchange 
Commission, 2002, p. 13) 
According to the Higher Education Directory (2013), there were 3,997 public and 
private institutions of higher education as of fall 2012 enrollment records. Within this 
composite number, 2,415 were private institutions, the category represented in this 
descriptive case study. From a governance perspective, private academic institutions of 
higher education face regulation oversight by national and regional institutions such as 
the Higher Learning Commission of North Central Association (2013), while their 
governance oversight remains unregulated compared to the scrutiny imposed by the SEC 
on the 12,000 publicly traded corporate boards (Skeel et al., 2011). 
Both corporate and academic governance function within regulatory jurisdictions 
that influence how they conduct their business. Oxholm (2005) examined the 
implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and explored aspects in which the intent 
of the Act was consistent with the aspirations of academia, and suggested applications 
colleges and universities could adopt as best practices from the Act. The purpose of the 
Act was to protect corporate investors by improving transparency from publicly traded 
corporations. The Act was not intended to apply to non-profit organizations, but the 
author provided a perspective on how the Act related to higher education in terms of 
corporate accountability. The author noted that the Act addressed financial oversight, as 
well as broader issues related to risk, integrity, and accountability. According to Oxholm, 
these best practices were necessary to guide conduct in higher education, similar to their 
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application to publicly traded corporations. The author recommended that best practices 
from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, should be adopted in academia before scandals 
force the requirement.  
Conclusion 
 Since the Wall Street financial crisis of 2002, there has been heightened research 
interest in the topic of board governance. This literature review illustrated that there is 
limited academic research employing descriptive qualitative studies based on the 
perspectives and opinions of the board members themselves. Larcker and Tayan (2011) 
identified CEO level experience as the single most important functional background for 
board members. The participation of CEOs in this qualitative descriptive case study 
added authenticity to the perspectives of chief executive officers serving on both 
corporate and academic boards. The chapter highlighted some of the current research on 
both academic and corporate governance, largely developed as quantitative studies reliant 
on existing database content and custom surveys instead of interviews with the 
participants themselves.  
 Feyerham’s (2009) research called for the professionalization of academic boards, 
while Oxholm (2005) specifically supported the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) best practices for academic boards. Corporate boards have been scrutinized by 
regulations enforced by the SEC with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, but compliance does 
not apply to academic boards. 
Summary 
 In selecting a qualitative research study, this author attempted to unpack how 
people construct the world around them (Flick, 2007a). Flick suggested that through 
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approaches such as compiling the experiences of individuals or groups; interactions and 
observing practices; or analyzing documents that trace the experiences of individuals and 
groups, qualitative research has entered an unprecedented period of growth in academia. 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) supported the use of interviews to assist in understanding 
the world from the subject’s viewpoint. The authors described interviews as the active 
process between interviewees and interviewers that produced knowledge. Flick 
reinforced Kvale and Brinkmann’s position by asserting that qualitative research was an 
inquiry project that aims to change the world through data collected from interviews 
using the procedures of coding and content analysis, similar to the method used in this 
research, computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA).  
The following chapter described the qualitative methods applied to this research 
study. As Chapter III unfolded, this writer borrowed from the analogy described by 
Collins (2001) in summarizing that the right people are in the right seats on the bus, as 
momentum builds on the journey of discovering new perspectives on board governance.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The review of literature revealed that there is limited academic research on 
corporate and academic board governance, and this author could not uncover academic 
research on the convergence of corporate and academic governance, the focus of this 
study. Governance boards are responsible for the ethical, legal, and operational oversight 
of the organizations they represent signifying important consequences for society 
(Hambrick et al., 2008). Corporate governance is highly regulated by the government, 
while academic governance is an unregulated dynamic in not-for-profit colleges and 
universities (Adams et al., 2010; Bastedo, 2009). This research is a qualitative descriptive 
case study of the perspectives of chief executive officers who serve as academic trustees 
to gather their perspectives related to serving on both corporate and academic governance 
boards.  
The Methodology Chapter contains a discussion on the Research Design, the 
Population of the participants in the study, a review of the Research Questions, details on 
the Data Collection and Analytical Methods, the Limitations of the Study, and the 
Conclusion. 
Research Design 
The qualitative case study method is suitable when the research seeks to respond 
to a descriptive question (Gay et al., 2012). This qualitative descriptive case study relies 
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on the components of individual interviews and direct observation, which examined the 
experiences of corporate and academic board members in order to gather insights on the 
dynamics of corporate and academic board governance. As Creswell (2013) noted, case 
study research approach investigates a bounded system, as it is happening, in order to 
interpret the experiences to make them known to outsiders. This approach was selected to 
respond to the research questions. 
The researcher has two decades of board governance sine qua non or 
indispensable observation exposure, which Leedy and Ormrod (2013) referred to as a 
useful cultural component in qualitative research. The author’s direct observations and 
familiarity with board governance are consistent with Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009) 
suggestion that interviews with elites require the researcher to be knowledgeable about 
the topic, as well as being a master of the technical language.  
The purpose of the study was to gain knowledge of the dynamics of board 
governance typically conducted in closed sessions. This study aimed to add to the body 
of knowledge on board governance traditionally conducted behind closed doors without 
the opportunity for direct observation. 
Research Questions 
 The qualitative descriptive case study had two research questions: 
1. How do chief executive officers who serve on both corporate and academic boards 
describe their experiences comparing the two governance models in terms of decision-
making efficiency, personal and professional reward, and commitment to the mission of 
the organizations?  
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2. How do chief executive officers perceive corporate board governance influences 
academic board governance? 
The questions used for the interviews are detailed in Appendix A and Appendix B. 
Population 
 The study participants were selected for their experience in, and knowledge of, 
board governance practices. The participants were business acquaintances of the 
researcher at various times over the past 20 years, or the gatekeepers introduced them to 
this researcher. The 11 chief executive officers represented a purposive population, and 
they were diverse in terms of demographics related to gender: 10 men, one woman and 
related to race: seven Caucasians, three African Americans, and one Hispanic. The chief 
executive officers represented six private colleges and universities located in the Midwest 
and Eastern geographic areas of the United States. The study participants were affiliated 
with corporations located in the Midwest and Southwest geographic areas of the United 
States with student populations ranging from more than 1,400 to more than 15,500, as 
detailed in Table 2.  
Approximately 80% of the study participants described their associations with 
publicly traded corporations, and 20% described their associations with corporations that 
were privately held corporations. Gibbs (2007) recommended anonymization, which was 
incorporated in this study to keep the participants’ names and organization associations 
confidential within the dissertation document. The researcher described the 
confidentiality standards to the participants both in the written Informed Consent 
document and verbally at each interview. 
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Table 2 
 
Participants’ Demographic Data and Study Identification Codes 
 
Participant Biography Corporate Board Academic 
Institution 
Academic Board 
 
Trustee 1 
 
 
Male, Caucasian 
retired CEO and 
Board Chair of a 
publicly traded 
global Consumer 
Retail Corporation 
located in the 
Midwest  
 
Board Chair and 
more than 20 
years board 
member of 
publicly traded 
corporation 
located in the 
Midwest  
 
Board 1 
 
Board Chair and 
member of private 
university located in 
the Midwest more 
than 20 years with 
enrollment of 
>15,500 students 
Trustee 2 Male, African 
American CEO of 
privately held 
conglomerate 
located in the 
Midwest 
Board member 
more than 20 
years of 
corporate 
publicly traded 
utility located in 
the Midwest  
Board 2 Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Northeast for six 
years with enrollment 
of >1,400 students 
Trustee 3 Female, Caucasian 
CEO of publicly 
traded Healthcare 
Services 
Corporation located 
in the Midwest 
Board Chair three 
years of publicly 
traded 
corporation 
located in the 
Midwest 
Board 3 Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest for nine 
years with enrollment 
of >15,500 
Trustee 4 Male, African 
American CEO of 
privately held 
Wealth Management 
Firm located in the 
Midwest 
Board member 
more than 10 
years of publicly 
traded 
corporation 
located in the 
Midwest 
Board 3 Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest more than 
10 years with 
enrollment of 
>15,500 
Trustee 5 Male, Caucasian 
CEO of publicly 
traded Global 
Healthcare 
Corporation located 
in the Midwest  
Board Chair and 
member more 
than 15 years of 
publicly traded 
corporation 
located in the 
Midwest  
Board 1 Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest more than 
10 years with 
enrollment of 
>15,500 students 
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Participant Biography Corporate Board Academic  
Institution 
Academic Board 
 
Trustee 6 
 
Male, African 
American CEO of 
publicly traded 
Global Consumer 
Services 
Corporation located 
in Europe 
 
Board member 
more than 20 
years of publicly 
traded consumer 
retail corporation 
located in a 
Western State  
 
Board 1 
 
Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest for nine 
years with enrollment 
of >15,500 students 
Trustee 7 Male, Hispanic CEO 
of privately held 
Consumer Products 
Corporation 
Board Chair of 
privately held 
corporation more 
than 10 years 
located in the 
Southwest  
Board 4 Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest for 10 years 
with enrollment of 
more than >6,500 
Trustee 8 Male, Caucasian 
CEO of publicly 
traded Global 
Consumer Services 
Corporation located 
in the Midwest  
Board member 
for two years of 
publicly traded 
corporation 
located in the 
Midwest 
Board 4 Board Vice Chair of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest for nine 
years with enrollment 
of >6,500 
Trustee 9 Male, Caucasian 
CEO of privately 
held Consumer 
Services 
Corporation located 
in the Midwest 
Board member 
more than 20 
years of publicly 
traded 
corporation 
located in the 
Midwest 
Board 5 Board Chair and 
member of private 
college more than 15 
years with enrollment 
of >3,200 
Trustee 10 Male, Caucasian 
CEO of privately 
held Financial 
Services 
Corporation located 
in the Midwest 
Board member 
for more than 20 
years of privately 
held corporation 
located in the 
Midwest 
Board 6 Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest for nine 
years with enrollment 
of >6,500 
Trustee 11 Male, Caucasian 
CEO of privately 
held Consumer 
Products 
Corporation located 
in an Eastern State 
Board Chair and 
member for more 
than 10 years of 
publicly traded 
corporation 
located in an 
Eastern State  
Board 1 Board member of 
private university 
located in the 
Midwest for six years 
with enrollment of 
>15,500 students 
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Data Collection 
 The time intervals of the interviews were conducted within 45-minutes, allowing 
for a wrap-up session that did not exceed an interval of one hour for all study 
participants. The recordings ranged in length of time from 20 to 57 minutes to maintain 
the maximum time of one hour in accordance with the interview protocol. The 
participants were asked the same interview questions to provide a methodical opportunity 
to gather responses. The interview questions are stated in Appendix A and Appendix B. 
The interviews were conducted over a period of time from October 2013 to June 
2014. The location of eight of the interviews took place in the offices of the CEOs, and 
three interviews were conducted the researcher’s office. One interview was conducted by 
speaker telephone in the researcher’s office. All interviews were conducted in a private, 
professional setting to maintain confidentiality. The study participants were not 
compensated for their time, but they were given an A.T. Cross pen as a token of 
appreciation for their time and involvement. Ten of the interviews were digitally recorded 
using both an Olympus Digital Voice Recorder for producing a MP3 audio file, and a 
Zoom HN4 Handy Digital Recorder for producing a WAV audio file. The two devices 
produced identical files that were stored for transcription in the two audio archival 
methods. One interview was conducted by taking notes. 
The interviews were transcribed from the audio files using Dragon Dictate for 
MAC (3.0) Speech Recognition Software (2012). The researcher dictated the content 
from the audio-recorded interviews by listening through an audio ear bud, while speaking 
the content of the audio file into the Dragon Dictate with the microphone headset 
supplied with the software. The software was preloaded with a profile of the researcher’s 
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voice in the manner recommended and supported by Dragon Dictate. Gay et al. (2012) 
described Dragon Dictate as useful for writing interview narratives. 
The researcher confirmed the accuracy of the transcription through repeated 
comparisons from the recorded file to the transcribed rich text format (RTF) document. 
When the content of the RTF document was proofed for accuracy, it was also saved and 
copied into a Word document for coding purposes. The RTF documents were uploaded to 
the software ATLAS.ti database for computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
(CAQDAS). Gibbs (2007) recommended verbatim transcriptions or summarizing the gist, 
as natural speech is often non-grammatical. Careful listing was applied through the audio 
recording and the researcher’s notes from the interviews. All original audio files and 
transcribed documents were password secured on the researcher’s personal computer, 
which was retained in a secured home office. 
Reliability and Validity 
Reliability in qualitative research does not have statistical tests and instrument 
standards such as those available to quantitative research. The researcher ensured that the 
data was collected in a consistent manner utilizing similar techniques for each interview 
to safeguard reliability in this study (Gay et al., 2012). 
 Similar to quantitative studies, this qualitative study addressed the important 
aspect of validity by establishing trustworthiness in terms of, and understanding of, the 
research findings. Descriptive validity is the factual accuracy of the text, which was 
achieved through deep, repeated reading of the transcripts of the interviews and the 
researcher’s notes from the interviews (Gay et al., 2012). 
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 Theoretical validity required the researcher to report on the phenomenon 
described in the research questions (Gay et al., 2012). Every effort was made for this 
study to report on the perspectives of CEOs who serve as Academic Trustees comparing 
the two governance structures as detailed in Chapter IV. 
 Evaluative validity defined the importance of the research to report the findings in 
an unbiased manner (Gay et al., 2012). The researcher acknowledges the opportunity for 
bias, and made every attempt to report the findings without judgment or prejudice. 
Before conducting the interviews, the research questions were piloted by a 
corporate board governance expert and two academic governance experts to validate 
authenticity. The subject matter expert on academic governance was a professor at 
Harvard University and a well-known in professional organizations such as the 
Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities (AGB), which provides 
seminars and workshops on academic boards. A second academic governance expert 
employed by the AGB reviewed the research questions and suggested certain wording 
changes to the interview questions, which were incorporated. The corporate board subject 
matter expert was a professor in the Australian School of Business at the University of 
New South Wales, with a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago who 
authored many academic journal articles on corporate board governance.  
Analytical Methods 
The methodology selection of interviews with elites who were knowledgeable on 
corporate and academic governance was chosen to respond to the two research questions. 
Board meetings are typically held behind closed doors without the opportunity for direct 
observation. The researcher deemed that including the perspectives of chief executive 
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officers using their own words was the best method to respond to the two research 
questions. 
 The study relied on computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) for content management in order to analyze the qualitative data contained in 
the transcripts and interview notes. The researcher selected the software ATLAS.ti, (7.1) 
(2014) for this purpose, which was referenced by both Leedy and Ormond (2013) and 
Gibbs (2007) as being useful for storing and identifying codes and patterns in qualitative 
data. The software was described as being beneficial in the inductive approach referred to 
as open coding, creating new codes, and existing codes, and for its ability to perform 
lexical searching to link codes. CAQDAS entered the marketplace in the 1980s, and they 
have gained popularity in assisting with qualitative research data management (Gibbs). 
Through proprietary tools offered by ATLAS.ti, (7.1) (2014) including a webinar 
and a Quick Tour Study Guide, the researcher was able to acquire knowledge of the 
advanced capabilities of the software such as, categorizing data, interlinking data 
segments, data analysis and theory-building by utilizing word cruncher and query tools. 
Word cruncher created a word frequency count that could be used for identifying 
correlations among participants’ remarks by gathering commonly used terms used to 
respond to the interview questions.  
The software provided a visual display for word frequencies, and a query tool 
allowed the researcher to retrieve quotations, predetermined codes and code-families, and 
categories by utilizing data tracking referred to as a Hermeneutic unit (ATLAS.ti, 7.1, 
2014). The software categorized code words leading to common themes analysis. The use 
of coding in data collection allowed for the potential of correlating thematic responses 
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from the study participants. According to Flick (2007b), coding and categorizing are the 
most prominent methods for analyzing qualitative research. By utilizing the ATLAS.it 
(7.1) (2014) computer software the researcher reinforced the aspect of validity to the text 
analysis. 
The ATLAS.ti (7.1) (2014) query tool called Code Co-occurrence identified all 
codes that co-occur across all of the transcribed documents of interviews resulting in a 
cross-tabulation of all codes. Results can be displayed in either a tree view or data matrix 
view. This was useful in the evidence analysis of the content of the multiple interviews 
for exploring patterns of responses to answer the research questions further discussed in 
the study results in Chapter IV.  
Limitations 
 The author acknowledged that qualitative research is wrought with both rich 
content and physical barriers. The research was reliant on text for analysis, and text from 
the interview transcriptions and the interview notes created a volume of data to 
synthesize. Analysis required filtering systems to respond to the research questions, 
which was subject to the researcher’s bias. Every effort was made to reduce the 
researcher’s bias, yet the qualitative research process demands the bias must be 
acknowledged (Gay et al., 2012). Additionally, CEOs can be cautious of sharing their 
unbiased opinions since their experience participating in academic research can be 
limited. This group frequently participates in conversations in the public arena reporting 
on issues related to shareholder concerns and financial performance. This study sought 
opinions and perspectives not related to financial performance. 
 The study participants consisted of a purposive pool of CEOs who served as 
Academic Trustees, which is a narrow cross-section of a specific group of people. This 
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limitation could be resolved in future studies by inviting other corporate leaders, such as 
Chief Financial Officers, General Counsels, and Auditors who serve on Academic Boards 
to provide their perspectives on the two governance structures to increase the depth and 
breath of the scope of a study on board governance.  
An additional limitation was that the study focused on private colleges and 
universities. Public university boards are typically smaller than private boards and the 
members are usually appointed to serve by a state governor, and perspectives from 
academic board members in that pool were not included in this study. Finally, as a 
qualitative study, this descriptive case study lacked the experimental elements commonly 
found in quantitative studies that could lead to predictive possibilities on board 
governance. 
Summary 
 This qualitative descriptive case study of the perspectives of CEOs who serve as 
Academic Trustees was conducted utilizing interviews with this elite, purposive 
population. The researcher integrated validity into the study by establishing 
trustworthiness between the participants in this context-bound study (Gay et al., 2012). 
The deep reading of the text of the transcripts and interview notes incorporated reliability 
by considering the consistency of the interview process and by considering how the 
consistency of interview questions were collected over time. The relevant content that 
was disclosed in this qualitative descriptive case study of the perspectives of CEOs who 
serve as Academic Trustees is furthered discussed in Chapter IV, Findings and 
Conclusions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative descriptive case study on the perspectives of chief 
executive officers serving as academic trustees was to add to the body of knowledge on 
the dynamics of board governance from an insider’s viewpoint. The study incorporated 
the words of the board members themselves to expose shared characteristics, unique 
delineations, and best practices from the two governance traditions. There were two 
research questions that guided this study. The chapter contains details of the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Implications and Recommendations. The discussion begins with the 
Findings. 
Findings 
The sample of participants consisted of a purposive, homogenous group of 11 
(N=11) chief executive officers who also served as academic trustees (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2013). In this study, the categorical profile data (N=11) of the participants included 
representation of two independent variables of: Ethnicity (three levels of Caucasian 64%, 
African American 27%, Hispanic 9%) and Gender (two levels of male 91%, female 9%). 
Larcker and Tayan (2011) pointed out that having chief executive officer (CEO) 
experience was the most significant criteria for becoming a member of a board, while 
Stern and Westphal (2010) described board appointments as markers of career success. 
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The following findings were the result of interviews conducted with this purposive 
sample of elite CEO board members. 
Themes 
A coding hierarchy was established to categorize the participants’ responses. 
First, open coding was utilized by a line-by-line review of the transcripts from the 
interviews by comparing individual participant’s responses to others. This was achieved 
through manual review of the transcripts, as well as through lexical searching in 
ATLAS.ti, and the researcher’s interview notes. The procedure of open coding analysis 
was followed by axial coding, a filtering process used to narrow the themes and concepts 
from the open coding (Gibbs, 2007). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) pointed out that 
thematizing interviews clarifies the theme of the study by adding conceptual and 
theoretical understanding to the phenomena investigated.  
Research Question One: How do chief executive officers who serve on both 
corporate and academic boards describe their experiences comparing the two governance 
models in terms of decision-making efficiency, personal and professional rewards, and 
commitment to the mission of the organization?  
The following four themes emerged in response to Research Question One: 1. 
Board Membership: Selection and Expertise; 2. Making Decisions; 3. Maintaining 
Mission and Shareholder Value; and, 4. Personal and Professional Rewards. 
Board Membership: Selection and Expertise. 
A prominent theme that surfaced during the discussion on how corporate boards 
influence academic boards focused on how members were selected. Trustees 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, and 11, roughly 82% of the 11 participants remarked that the academic board 
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asked for members to recommend individuals they knew from their business 
relationships, in contrast to Trustees 1, 3, 4, and 6 who indicated they were selected to the 
academic board because they were alumnus. All trustees except 4 and 6, approximately 
82% of the 11 participants, noted corporate boards asked for board member 
recommendations when filing vacancies. The processes were not dissimilar between 
corporate and academic boards seeking personal referrals for board candidates, though 
using a professional search firm in either board searches was not a common practice. The 
findings supported Pusser et al.’s (2006) research that identified corporate board interlink 
relationships were prominent among individuals serving on corporate boards. 
Trustee 10: On the recruiting of new corporate members, a lot of it was with other 
people you knew. You wanted some people that had stature in the community and 
expertise in your area, so you're not starting from ground zero in educating 
somebody. There was a vetting process that arrived at somebody that would be 
acceptable, and they could sell the stockholders as well. We did not use an outside 
firm, as other directors know a lot of people. For the academic board a lot goes 
into this question on the selection process for academic boards. Many are people 
you know. For people who will be involved in a nonprofit, it is also one of the 
more expensive jobs they will have because you are expected to make 
contributions to the college. It does not mean you have to have expertise in the 
institution, because most people don't. But, you get a broad group of people. 
There is a big push in colleges for diversity and that's a little difficult to achieve to 
get qualified people with a diverse background, because some of those diverse 
areas have smaller populations. You want to get somebody that would be a good 
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contributor. All boards do that today, but when you have a large board to fill it is 
a challenge. You really look for people, that as I always tell the presidents of the 
college, consider the trustees your personal consultants. You are not going to use 
them all, but if there’s 10 of them that you can draw expertise from, guidance 
from, counsel from, do it. Command is a lonely position, and it helps to have 
places to go when you have a problem. 
Trustee 9: The selection process for the corporate board is autonomous. I use the 
senior team to vet potential candidates and the decision-making is usually through 
the corporate office to make sure there is no objection. And we check with the 
General Counsel as well. The board members are appointed not selected. This is a 
private company so that allows us to do things different than a public bank 
corporation would do. In terms of expertise, community involvement is very 
important, as those are people who are well networked. And we try to get people 
that have different business demographics: Manufacturing, healthcare, and the 
service industry, so we try to get the mix of people with different professional 
backgrounds. We do not use a search firm for board members, but I have thought 
about it. I have talked to somebody locally about that, but we are not going to that 
method as of yet. 
Trustee 11: The directors were all selected for their talent and special 
backgrounds in audit, finance or operations. The board selection process was 
people that had backgrounds in the metals business. We had a finance expert who 
served on President Sr. Bush's advisory council. Another was a former auditor 
and controller with U.S. Steel, and he was head of the audit committee. Most of 
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the board members were selected on backgrounds with metals companies or 
finance companies or some type of operating background; those are the three 
buckets we looked at. We did not use a search committee. The selection process 
came from either people we know in Chicago or Pittsburgh. One came as a 
recommendation from my brother, and another person was an academic. The 
other people I personally know in the steel business. The selection process for the 
academic board I have not been personally involved, but I have been involved in 
the governance committee that the candidates are brought up through. The 
expertise on the academic board is more finance background and governance 
related backgrounds, so everyone understands what governance is and the shared 
responsibilities. When they are vetting people with those backgrounds they will 
probably be stronger members. 
Trustee 5: The selection process for the corporate board is detailed in our proxy. 
There is a rigorous process. Sometimes we get nominations from left field, and 
we will read those, but there is an established process. We hired an outside 
research firm that we typically go to. Since I've been at my organization, we've 
brought on five new directors, and we have done that through the same search 
firm. As long as they deliver high-quality candidates the same search firm is 
knowledgeable of the culture of the company and what we're looking for. We are 
very transparent in what qualities we are looking for in directors and transparent 
as to the processes by which candidates get surfaced. 
Trustee 6: The search process for the corporate board was done through a search 
committee using a search firm. They called me and asked if I was interested in a 
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director's seat. I interviewed with the lead director and the CEO. I was involved in 
other board member searches. They would give a list to the board members to see 
if we knew anybody on the list. In some cases board members interviewed 
potential candidates. They were looking for certain expertise, for instance, when I 
was being recruited, they were looking for people that knew about the telecom 
industry and that was my direct responsibilities at my organization. I knew the 
industry quite well. The selection process for an academic board is really unclear. 
In terms of expertise, academic boards like to bring in people that have 
competencies to know what they need, for example, people who know 
construction during a building boom. People that understand healthcare, while we 
board members don't know anything about running a university, similarly, when I 
was on a Symphony board none of us were musicians. 
Trustee 8: The corporate board selection process was generally tapping into 
networks of existing board members by asking people who would be a good fit 
from a board perspective because teamwork and interaction was very important in 
a corporate environment. There was some balancing of skills, for instance, for the 
finance committee you needed SEC definition of financial expert. More of it was 
people you knew who would be a good fit culturally. At the time you're looking 
for more diversity on the board so that became criteria. The chair also worried 
about who would be friendly to his point of view. There was a practical reality of 
how people got picked. The chair was the head of the governance committee. The 
board members did not get to meet the incumbent people that were up for board 
positions. They did meet the members of the governance committee, but they did 
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not meet the other members of the board. For the academic board selection, we 
need board members who have those networks that we can tap into, and we are 
trying to raise money. Money and the ability and willingness to give are number 
one criteria. As a private institution, where values are based on alignment with the 
mission and values of the University, is also an important prerequisite. Relevant 
life and business experience that would help is a nice thing, but the first two are 
probably the main things that we use for criteria for new board members. 
Trustee 7: When I'm looking for new corporate board member, I look at what can 
they bring to the board what type of experience can they bring to the board. For 
example, one person came on the board that had a marketing background with 
many of our third party customers. I look at what our current needs and current 
strategies are. A third outside board member is a lawyer and CPA out of LA. He 
helps at the finance committee, and he needed to be outside the company with 
those competencies. So, we built the board to fit those strategies and 
competencies. The selection process for of the academic board there is a 
trusteeship committee that does the nominations and profiles. We needed 
expertise in nursing, and we added a female member who is a CEO of a large 
hospital. So, I would say we are looking for expertise and for people who are in 
an economic position to donate as well. So, it’s a balance between those two. 
Trustee 1: The selection process for corporations is personal contacts sometimes 
search firms are used, and interviews take place and background checks are made. 
They look for corporate experience. Various attributes the board members 
demonstrate are success in their business life, and they hone it down to a few 
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candidates and usually the chairman of the board and the CEO conduct personal 
interviews with the last candidates. In a corporate board, the expertise level is a 
high level of business leadership, social responsibility, financial experience, and 
success in leading whatever businesses they were involved in. 
Trustee 2: For the corporate board, in terms of experience in a certain field, it 
might be finance and business those were the two peak areas that people that 
served in looking at the various committees. We needed people with experience 
for each committee. For example, the audit committee had people that already 
served on audit committees with industry experience, which we brought to the 
table. The board felt that was important, because each of us had fiduciary 
responsibility to the shareholders to make sure that things are being done right. 
We looked at various goals and strategies of the company, and not only if it 
included reaching the financial goals set by the CEO and approved by the board, 
but it also included areas of sustainability and things of that nature as well. 
Academic board selection: Certain criteria that the academic board would be 
looking for depending on the time they may be looking for somebody with 
background human resources or accounting, but typically they looked for 
leadership. People that are leaders in their community well thought of in their 
community, and are accustomed to getting things done. They can bring those 
resources to the table to help at any given time to move some of the initiatives and 
goals of the University. 
Trustee 3: The selection process for new board members were pretty typical for 
corporate boards, to rely a lot on recommendations by existing board members. 
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There would be discussions about what the board needed and the capabilities we 
wanted to bring on and the existing board members networks would be activated. 
From there, the governance committee oversaw it. A board member was the chair 
of a major professional search firm, so he tapped into a supercharged 
knowledgeable person for that role. We would add additional names to the pile. 
The company may down the road use a search firm, but at the time the company 
was only a public company for two years and in the interest of time, the networks 
seem to work well with expertise. The biggest thing with that we were looking for 
was somebody that had contemporary CEO of a public company experience and 
had a track record of driving the kind of quick results - it couldn't be a safe hands 
caretaker CEO of a public company. We were looking for that bull's-eye of 
somebody that really created something and had grown it rapidly over a period of 
time. It was a hard spec to find. 
Trustee 3: For the academic board, a small group of the executive committee 
knows a lot more than I on this topic. People are looking for an alumnus that has a 
great deal of success and might feel their affiliation with the University helped 
drive that success and they want to devote their energy and philanthropic 
investments in the University. 
Trustee 4: The expertise level for corporate board members is a history of success, 
active in the community, and have risen to the highest level of their profession. 
The expertise level sought for academic board memberships are similar to 
corporate but more community involvement and commitment to the University. 
At my University there are a lot of alumni on the board. 
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Board Member Interlocking Relationships. 
The common practice of recommending future corporate board members and 
academic trustees was cited by Pusser et al. (2006), as a source of increasing trust among 
board members. These interlock relationships were common on corporate boards, and 
they have been adopted by academic boards, as governance networks increased. 
According to the researchers, the larger the size of academic boards increased the 
probability of interlock relationships, and they noted that the phenomenon was self-
perpetuating on private boards reliant on drawing membership from current board 
members.  
In a related study, Adams and Ferreira (2007) looked at the relationship between 
corporate board members and the chief executive officer. The data inferred that when 
there was a friendly relationship between the directors and the chief executive officer, 
higher quality advice was given to the chief executive officer, thus protecting shareholder 
value. This research focused on the important role relationships have on corporate board 
effectiveness. Many of the participants of this dissertation affirmed the position of Adams 
and Ferreira. 
Trustee 2: The selection process for academic board membership is mostly 
personal contacts. In a corporate board the expertise level is a high level of 
business leadership, social responsibility, financial experience, and success in 
leading whatever businesses they were involved in. The expertise level on the 
academic board members would be very much the same with the addition of 
willingness to support the University financially. All corporate board members 
were asked to give names that would make a contribution to the board, such as 
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people that they served with on other publicly traded boards. That was always a 
good source of talent getting a personal recommendation from a key executive in 
the community that was very important, and that was as good, if not better than a 
search firm. They attempted to have a good representation of the community. 
They wanted a diverse board. 
Trustee 9: In terms of academic board member expertise, we look for financial 
expertise, investment expertise, academic, and real estate. I chair the plant and 
building committee, so we look for that background. Development capabilities are 
certainly important and people that are well-connected. Representation from the 
major companies in town, the Fortune 500 companies are important. A 
combination of having the networking ability and those people also come with a 
fair amount of business acumen as well. 
Making Decisions. 
Migliore and DeClouette (2011) pointed out that a collaborative environment 
encouraged shared leadership at all levels for effectively making decisions, as fiduciaries 
related to allocation of organizational resources. The researcher asserted that trusting 
relationships were key to meaningful boardroom discussions. The participants in this 
descriptive case study affirmed Migliore’s work inferring that decision-making is 
complex in both corporate and academic boards.   
Trustee 10: Corporate level decision-making is probably not as shared simply 
because of the timeframe and the intensity of the things the board has to get done. 
I'm a strong believer in working with business plans and colleges have not been 
very good at doing that over the years. That helps you make your decisions. It is 
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your mission, it has what you're doing to protect the brand, and it is a document 
that if anybody even at colleges when people want to do their own things and they 
can stray. It’s easy to take the document and say this was not in the plan. It gives 
you a guide. Decision-making is easier in the corporate level in terms of timing of 
it. Colleges the ramifications may be a little more laborious. 
Trustee 9: The academic boards are much slower things because we meet 
quarterly. You might come to the committee one quarter and then it gets vetted at 
the next quarter, finalized and brought to the board a year later. I’m always 
amazed at the things that we’ve been talking about for years. Sometimes whether 
or not it’s getting through the committees, dealing with the faculty and their 
approval is a much more timely process. Whereas the corporate board, as a public 
for-profit public company, they have an obligation to the shareholders to bring to 
bear decisions in a much quicker fashion. I would say the time frame is one of the 
big differences. The vetting process is probably deep and rich in both institutions, 
but the ability to move it along quicker in the public arena is much greater.  
Trustee 11: In terms of decision-making processes the public boards are much 
more involved in the decision-making processes with management, and the 
academic board is not involved in day-to-day type decisions. The current public 
boards are much more involved in decision-making and input on the strategic 
impact of day-to-day operations on the company. When you transition to the 
academic board, you’re bringing that information. How do you protect the other 
board members; how do you ask the right questions to management and protect 
other board members. Kind of being the devil’s advocate for other board members 
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in questions to management, to make sure board members are asking the right 
question in case something happens like Penn State. The board is challenging 
management asking for answers so the public board experience is valuable. If I 
had not been on the public board I would not have perspective of what to ask. 
Really management needs to protect the board to ask questions on behalf of the 
board so the record reflects that in case something bad would happen. 
Trustee 7: The decision making process is grueling when you're comparing an 
academic to corporate board. Normally on the corporate board the votes come 
hard and fast. And normally it's a unanimous because you are aligned as to where 
the business is going. There is vigorous debate, but part of it is the size of the 
board. You can’t have too much vigorous debate in a large group. So academic 
decision-making is just not the same. It's slower, and it's probably not as clear-cut 
as it would be in a corporation board. There is a lot more politics around academic 
boards, certainly more than I expected. There is a lot more consideration of the 
impact of that decision on the student body or the teacher body, which is normal. I 
think the decisions are much slower on the academic side.  
Trustee 8: On the academic side a lot more work is done the committee level in 
the decision-making process than I've seen a in the corporate environment. 
Committees will make recommendations, but there's a lot of debate and 
sometimes dissension. The university environment even at the committee level 
board members tend to defer to management and administration of the University 
much more than you would see in a corporate environment. There is less risk for 
board members, as they are not going to get typically sued. In a corporate level 
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there's a lot of risk and pressure in the corporate environment. The corporate 
environment if the board disagrees they are personally at risk, and they will stop 
it. There's more direct involvement in the decision-making processes in a 
corporate environment than what I see in an academic environment. 
Trustee 1: The decision-making processes in a corporation and an academic board 
are very similar. Both have executive committees, both have committees to 
address important issues related to either shareholder value or the health of the 
corporation or the mission, and finances of both the corporation and the 
University board. They pretty much cover everything. 
Trustee 3: In terms of decision-making, both types of boards, I’ll be very honest 
with you, often have the work supposition that the leaders of the institution are 
coming to the board with recommendations that are fully baked. There won't be 
that much needed or the real robust questioning and prodding and revisiting the 
dangers. They can fall into the trap of being inclined toward rubberstamping. 
Where the quality of engagement goes up, is when the management team comes 
to the board with the idea that is 80% baked and truly has teed up some options 
for the last 20%. Asking for the board to help deal with that seems to get 
engagement up, because people are not asked to rubberstamp it. There are some 
pieces of it that they're asking for feedback on, sharing alternatives, and which 
ways they are inclined toward. Even if they do that as a process step, the degree of 
new engagement from the board would be quite high. 
Trustee 4: Chairs are, in good corporate meetings, keeping board members 
informed. Academic decision making on academic boards most of the decisions 
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come through the executive committee, which is a function of board size at this 
university. The executive committee meets monthly compared to quarterly for the 
full board. 
Board size. 
 Ning et al.’s (2010) study noted that since the 2002 Wall Street financial collapse, 
corporate boards with fewer members, ranging from seven or less, increased in size, 
while larger boards with 12 or more members, shrunk in size. This reversion trend in 
corporate board size suggested that board independence and staggered board structure 
may be linked to board size. The researchers concluded that based on agency theory, 
there were costs when boards were too large, while resource dependency theory pointed 
out that larger boards were beneficial in providing access to more external resources. The 
participants in this study acknowledged that board size was a determinant in board 
member participation, the number of committees needed on corporate versus academic 
boards, and the ability to make decisions. 
Trustee 10: You have to make sure you are reading the material. It is the old 
20/80 rule, some people 20% are engaged, and 80% are not. Larger boards are 
certainly unyielding, and there are a lot of committees, because we can get 
something done. There are 11 committees on the academic board. There is an 
executive committee. It doesn't meet very often because if it did meet often and 
made decisions, which it is allowed to do, you don't need a board. A lot of trustees 
would say, why are they there? 
Trustee 6: Since the corporate board is smaller the work gets parsed out to fewer 
people and there is more to do. On the corporate board I was on two committees. 
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Those committees took up a lot of time and a lot of studying and work, not so 
much in the academic board. 
Trustee 9: The academic board has 40 members, and they meet four times a year 
for approximately two and half hours. Comparing the corporate board to the 
academic board, the size of boards has a dynamic application. At the academic 
board, the majority of the work is done in the committees because of the size. The 
committee meetings are three or four hours long. It would meet within a day or so 
the full board meeting. The corporate board, because the size is so small you can 
do more in-depth, hence the reason committees aren’t necessary. 
Trustee 7: When I first started on the university board, there were only 15 on the 
board. It has since grown over time. It's not as intimate as it was before. We use to 
be able to have frank discussions as a board, and those are now more reserved to 
the committees. You want to give everybody a voice and not everyone can have a 
voice with 35 people at the table. Now that we've worked long enough together, 
there's certain comfortableness in being able to have different discussions and 
making points and counterpoints. The smaller board to me was better, but I don't 
think it is realistic in a university. We had a hard time raising funds and for a long 
time we were in the red. For last 10 years we have been in the black, and a lot of 
it’s due to the board members. 
Trustee 8: The size of boards has a big impact. In a group of 35, you can't have a 
real discussion or debate. What I've found in my experiences at an academic 
board, more of the work and decision-making is at the committee level. There are 
more committees that are empowered by the board to make recommendations, 
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which are pretty much rubberstamped approval. The University also has an 
executive committee of four members. The presiding religious head of the 
university is the head of the executive committee. We just started it two years ago. 
All the committee chairs sit on the executive committee, as does the chairman of 
the board and the president.  
Trustee 6: In terms of carrying out business, you need a smaller board in 
corporate America; a large board is tough to coordinate schedules. It's unyielding 
and difficult to get decisions made. In the academic board, there are very few 
decisions to be made; most of the decisions are made for us. Most academic board 
members are there for guidance, but not for real decision-making. Certainly the 
chairman and vice chairman, the guys with the big bucks, get to make the big 
decisions. It’s not the rank-and-file board member. 
Trustee 2: I think size does matter if you had a board of 37 or 28 people trying to 
run a publicly traded company. It would be very, very difficult to get things done. 
If I had a bias, it would be toward a smaller corporate board. I think it would be 
the bias of most CEOs. You rarely will find a publicly traded company with more 
than 11 to 15 people normally that's the size. Academic boards are much larger,  
and they usually have more committees, 10 to 11 committees probably closer to 
12 committees. There's plenty of work to do in having a board of that size to give 
you an opportunity to have a good selection of people that serve on usually 2 to 3 
different committees. 
Trustee 5: The trend to smaller corporate boards is the function of a couple things. 
One is a supply issue. I think it's also people are finding that it is tougher to 
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manage a larger board. You need to get concessions or alignment on various 
issues, and as a practical matter it is harder to do that with 13 people versus nine. 
There is a flipside to that you want to have enough diversity of view and 
experience so that you don't always gravitate to alignment. It is not the healthiest. 
You want some constructive friction; that is good governance. Constructive 
friction on a board is healthy. It has to be constructive. You want that. 
Simplistically, there is an inverse relationship between size and efficiency in 
getting to a decision point in making decisions no doubt about that. But I think 
certain entities like a university needs a larger board for other reasons. For matters 
of policy and disclosure and those kinds of things, set up a process that allows you 
to involve and communicate with the 50 people without the 50 people being 
involved in the discussion of every matter is such a challenge. There’s ways to do 
it, and it works well. 
Maintaining Mission and Shareholder Value. 
The oversight role of governance boards requires attention to the organization’s 
mission and value creation. Earlier research conducted by Finegold et al. (2001) 
examined the attributes needed to build and to engage effective corporate boards of 
directors. The researchers concluded that the motivations for building more effective 
boards were: to gain strategic advice; to secure resources; to manage crises; to help 
develop leadership; and, to increase shareholder value. The researchers suggested several 
methods of building effectiveness such as: define the board’s strategic priorities and 
mission; determine the boards talent needs; annually assess the chief executive officer 
and board members; remove ineffective board members; provide timely information to 
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enable the board; allow time for the board to operate effectively; and, align director’s 
interests with the board’s mission. The subjects in this study acknowledged many similar 
recommendations for upholding the organization’s mission. 
Trustee 10: The mission is great in both organizations, and it is very important 
and so is branding. You have to protect it in the corporate environment. I was 
saying the next two or three years and going forward that intensity is going to 
increase in colleges. As we move forward, budgets, student enrollment, how do 
you protect those at colleges. Their product is, in effect, a product and the 
customer is a student. You have to protect what you put out there as a brand does 
it have value? How do you determine what they are learning? Students that can't 
get jobs? You have to ask yourself: is it government policies, is it what we're 
teaching them, and is it not translatable? So, trying to protect that giving the 
students some benefit when they leave here that they can support themselves. 
Protecting the brand is important. 
Trustee 6: Shareholder value is an issue at my organization. Shareholder meetings 
were quite long, and it was a wild experience. Implicit in shareholder value is the 
idea of a threat. You have activist shareholders. The atmosphere is different on 
academic boards. It is much more laid-back. Our shareholders are really students, 
and they don't come pounding on the door at a board meeting. Kids are passive. 
There isn’t a sense of urgency like a corporate board. 
Trustee 9: There are challenges of comparing corporate shareholder value and 
commitment of mission. We talk about that often, as you can imagine. I’m on the 
finance committee and when we’re approving budgets and spending capital 
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expenditures for buildings and other types of things there is that natural tension 
between to put up a rec center or to invest in a new program or college. So it’s a 
good give-and-take; there is a balanced viewpoint particularly being a Catholic 
University, mission is at the core of everything we do. We spend a lot of time 
making sure. Every year, every committee spends a half-hour talking about our 
mission and identity, so even if it’s a finance committee we anchor everyone back 
to the core values of my university. At the finance committee, as I’m sure you’ve 
heard, no margin – no mission, so if you’re not making money, you won’t be able 
to fulfill your mission. It’s a continuing conversation. In the balance there are 
priests on the board, so we have a core. They keep us focused, along with others, 
who have different demographic backgrounds. It is a continuing challenge and 
conversation that needs to be addressed regularly. 
Trustee 6: Prove your value proposition. If you can't you won't get any money. 
That's with the current topic of writings. They are all about if you can't prove a 
way should the government give you money. Those types of restrictions make 
you have to prove your proposition. With the corporation, the value proposition is 
easier to prove - either you're making money or you're not. The stock’s going up 
or it's not. It isn't subject to judgment either you’re doing something or you're not. 
Academic boards have emotional attachments to the organization like we do at 
my university. That doesn't exist in corporations. There is something inspiring in 
the mission of a university. On campus we see the students walking around. 
Companies aren’t doing that. Academic boards are not as bottom-line focus, so 
we look at social justice, things that a company wouldn't think of. 
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Trustee 11: Corporate boards in protecting shareholder value, I think the academic 
side is actually better in protecting their mission. Corporate boards the minute it's 
over your are preparing for the next board meeting, so there's a tremendous 
amount of time tied up in federal regulations, SEC regulations, legal work and all 
that preparation is a lot of nonproductive work. You're constantly involved in 
board activities. Many of your decisions are short-term because you're protecting 
shareholder value. Academic boards I think the mission of the university you 
don't see that as a force on the public side. In addition to shareholder value, what 
is the mission of this company? What else do we stand for? What do we 
accomplish beyond profitability? What is the mission? How do we give back? 
You never see it on public companies what do we give back to the community? I 
was always disappointed with that, and I would try to incorporate that in the 
corporate board. There isn’t a mission on the corporate side that I’ve seen. If we 
do this – we are going to give back that. My university clearly has a mission. We 
establish that these are the good things we are going to do. For example, taking 
money and deploying it in a good way. That’s a good thing. 
Trustee 7: In terms of value on academic boards, it is even more important as it 
affects my own pocket as a donor. We talk a lot of about our mission of protecting 
it. We never make a decision for instance in tuition increases and scholarship 
allocations without mission at the front and center of all those decisions. There are 
some difficult business decisions to make along the way, but especially on the 
academic side, if you don’t have the mission clear, as to what it is you want to get 
to, that’s a deficit. 
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Trustee 8: Mission is the main difference between corporate and academic board, 
and it is a continual challenge. We are a bit lucky. Of the 35 board members, eight 
are religious, so they are always very good at bringing up the mission of the 
institution, and how does it fit. Four years ago, we had our first strategic planning 
session, and we put clear screens and filters for enhancing the mission and every 
committee now uses that as a filter for every decision we make. How does it 
affect the mission directly or indirectly? Are there unintended consequences of 
some of these things around that question? For instance, one of our missions is to 
serve the underprivileged and with the increased costs of education it is a difficult 
thing to do. There is a relationship between the economics and the mission. If 
you're healthy financially you can afford to fund the mission. If you're not healthy 
financially, it's a barrier, and it makes it much more difficult to keep the mission 
top of mind. There is some tie into what you are doing on a corporate board to 
shareholder value and at a university. Strong enough financial wherewithal so that 
it can fund its mission. I think universities have been living in a bubble for a long 
time. The pressures around fees going up and people are questioning is it worth it 
- getting a degree costing $200,000? What is the return on investment? The 
external environment is changing, and it's going to require academic change much 
more rapidly than they have in the past the next 10 years in the world of Higher 
Ed. For example, technology: businesses have to deal with technology, and not 
just for payroll systems, but technology influences the way people have to teach. 
How do we preserve mission in online courses? These are very important strategic 
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questions we are trying to get our heads around, and it will change the face of 
Higher Education in the next five to 10 years. 
Trustee 2: I think there's a lot of similarities to the corporate board in those 
protections (mission and shareholder value), because they both have fiduciary 
responsibilities. Both need to be fiscally responsible and that requires some 
difficult decisions and balancing the budget. The cost of education continues to 
grow, and it is the issue to deal with regards to unions and tenure. In universities 
with tenure, there's issues with how do you make people transition when changes 
need to be made and the need to be respectful. There are a lot of similarities 
between the works of corporate and academic boards in each case there is a fiscal 
responsibility, and secondly, there is a responsibility to protect the brand you can 
call it mission, our brand, but it's very similar. 
Trustee 3: In terms of protecting the mission like shareholder value, I think the 
academic boards have the luxury of operating in supporting the fiduciary support 
of the mission, and they can readily get all the viewpoints of the trustees. There is 
freedom from legal liability and risk in things like that so people shy away today 
from corporate boards because of all the corporate liability and risk. We don't 
have that same thing in the University affiliation, but I think the key is to make it 
a meaningful and engaged opportunity for the trustee. The more the trustee gets 
out of it the more they're going to give back. Everything you can learn from the 
feeling that you get from being supportive of the University and the mission, 
which attracted you in the first place, and then the learning experiences, the new 
content and engagement, things that you're interested in, where the university is, 
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is the focal point of brain food. If we think of our core mission is to really 
educate, making things affordable is a key. Nobody's leading the pack in 
academia that I can see. Seeing how costs are going up faster than the CPI, and 
we could be a leader in that. The University has great results and increasing 
enrollment and increasing success in graduation rates, and so forth. It could be a 
good dynamic to declare, which are annual goals in a year-end report. 
Trustee 4: At my university the academic board's mission is to make it an 
attractive university for students, which attracts high level and renowned faculty. 
Trustee 5: The mission of our company is to save and sustain lives it is a 
healthcare company and our products have a fundamental role in order to fulfill 
the mission. Now you do it in the way that is sensitive to all the stakeholders and 
of course you're going to do it in a way that is sensitive to your investors and 
shareholders. So, we can give our products away for free in China and India, and 
we would say this is saving more lives. But, we would go broke because of being 
an unsustainable business model that would not generate acceptable returns. You 
start with the fact that no single stakeholder is going to get everything they want. I 
could increase my company's returns tomorrow if I would stop investing in R&D. 
I would cut payroll benefits for employees, engagement and community types of 
things, and we could drive earnings through the roof. The point is that it is not 
sustainable. How do you recognize the interconnectedness of all the stakeholders? 
I, we, start with our mission. How do we materially advance our ability to meet 
the demands of all of our stakeholders - always with a view of fulfilling that 
fundamental mission? I never want us to get too far away from that mission. We 
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are a publicly traded company, and we have to meet the demands of our 
shareholders no doubt. I believe long-term the best way to do that is to fulfill your 
mission. Don't lose sight of the mission. In some ways I think the best public 
companies when you think about it are not terribly different than nonprofits in 
terms of what their purpose is and with their existence. That's what I believe. Now 
a lot of people do not necessarily do that. But I think good companies that are 
building sustainable enterprises get that purpose and mission of the enterprise 
transcends everything. That is what I see is one of my fundamental purposes as 
the CEO, as chief communicator is always reinforcing the mission. 
Personal and Professional Rewards. 
The motivation for board membership was examined by looking at the personal 
and professional rewards described by the study participants. Research conducted by 
Bowen (2008) identified several key components required to strengthen board 
governance, such as understanding board partnership; recruiting board members for 
effective leadership; investment of time and resources for good governance; 
distinguishing nonprofit and for-profit board governance convergence; and, recognizing 
the rewards of board governance in both sectors. The participants in this dissertation 
expressed many personal and professional rewards in serving on corporate and academic 
boards, and in some cases, they expressed their roles serving on academic boards were 
more personally rewarding. 
Trustee 10: In terms of the personal and professional rewards, you build personal 
relationships and learn how to interact with others, deal with the egos to get things 
done, particularly more so in the corporate environment than the college 
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environment. The people on this academic staff, it amazes me that they do a lot 
for not a whole lot not a whole lot of compensation, so there's a lot of labor of 
love. To see things implemented, that's what it's all about. You can have the 
greatest plans in the world, but if they're not implemented, it does not matter. To 
see that come out in a corporate or college level, it's very satisfying, that's fun. 
Trustee 11: In terms of personal and professional rewards starting with the public 
board, is an excellent learning experience for someone going to work on an 
academic board from my perspective. From working with lawyers and finance 
people in the public board the requirements are very regimen. I think you learn 
what you should be doing correctly, so there's a huge education process with 
outside input from accounting firms and legal firms and other board members. I 
would not have learned that if I'd only served on an academic board or in a board 
of a small company that was not public. You get tremendous learning experience 
being on a public company board.  
Trustee 6: In terms of personal and professional rewards I feel good on both 
situations if I feel I added something to the board. If my skill sets are used and 
someone benefited from what I did, I can feel very fulfilled in either one. I am on 
the academic committee, and that has kept me engaged. And at a recent board 
meeting we had a discussion about combining business law and health. I've been 
talking about this for six years, and we never really did it. We can't get the deans 
to sit down and make it happen. In the corporate world that would never happen, I 
would have, as CEO, made them work together and make it happen. You have to 
make them see there's a gain there for everybody - that's how you get their buy-in 
79 
 
and how you put change together like that. But, in academia, we put it in the 
strategic plan and will do it one day, but not until we get those deans on board. 
Trustee 8: On the business side it is more intellectually challenging to be a 
corporate board member a lot more. You get more out of it that will help you 
professionally, because it's business and you can learn things from it more 
directly. It's not as personally rewarding as the academic board is, and we get a 
little more frustrated with the bureaucracy, but when things move forward, it is 
more personally rewarding. You do get some learning. You can learn anything 
any time, so there is some learning benefits, but not as much as I did from the 
corporate side. 
Trustee 7: My personal rewards on the corporate board are just that it's my every 
day, so it is just a fact of life. It's a business requirement. The academic side, it's 
more gratifying than the corporate side, because you feel like you're contributing 
something bigger that just than just running your own business. And I can see it as 
I drive to the campus. I can see the progress over 12 years is almost 
unrecognizable. It's vibrant with more buildings and the student body has grown. 
You see students that are impacted by the scholarships and all that, and it's very 
satisfying. In terms of personal rewards, to me the charity side is much more 
rewarding than the business side, because I am in the middle level of my life and 
career. It’s time to give something back. To me the corporate board is just 
business as usual, and even if it wasn't just my board. The attraction there is 
intellectual stimulation, right. But the economic part doesn't really play a role 
anymore. It’s much more gratifying to be able to give your money, and your 
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input, to an institution like a university. It has been very rewarding to me over the 
years. 
Trustee 1: My personal and professional rewards serving on these boards are a 
great deal of satisfaction watching the growth and success, not just financially, but 
in terms of mission and quality of the University, treatment of the students, 
success rate of the students and growth in both the corporate and executive life. I 
took a great deal of satisfaction from both. 
Trustee 2: Personal professional rewards in terms of academic boards it's very 
similar. The longer you serve on the board with individuals, the more rewarding it 
will be because serving with individuals on a particular committee over time. In 
three or four years you get to know the individuals and see them in action, how 
they think, how they participate in exchange of ideas that you have with them, 
break bread with them at lunch or dinner a number of times those relationships 
develop. When that happens it's magical because that's when you really start 
brainstorming about getting things you haven’t thought about. Let’s think about 
doing it differently let's think out of the box. Corporate boards have 
compensation, but less importance is on that than the importance of making a 
contribution to the well-being of the company, to being a part of the work that 
moves the company from this point to another point to be able to say during my 
tenure on the board we saw our company go from so many billions of dollars in 
revenue to double that. We improved shareholder value from X to three times X. 
All participants on the board are goal driven people. They are self-starters. 
Compensation is nice for some. It might be more important than others, but by 
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and large my experience in 20 years on a corporate board, is the rewards are from 
working with other executives that you grow to respect and appreciate. It helps 
you as an individual to be a better mentor, to be a better leader, and a better 
individual because you learn. It's a learning experience. You go there to 
contribute, and they want to tap into your past experience from other boards or 
running whatever company. But, as you come aboard, and you do that, you find 
that you’re learning as much from the other folks at the table. It’s very refreshing 
and very rewarding. You develop a camaraderie that is infectious, and it helps the 
company and the culture of the company. 
Trustee 3: In a corporate board people join it because of the prestige of being on 
the corporate board, and it will be helpful to their career, and there is going to 
have an economic incentive. There are boards that can cause you to lose money. 
Boards that want you to invest money as a board member and in turn the stock 
price doesn't go up. It is a risky proposition people have to think it through 
carefully. I personally get more out of being on boards of younger companies that 
are still private, or the management team is really trying to tap into the 
capabilities of the board members they are bringing on. Jointly, the board and the 
management team will help a company accelerate through growth. That's 
exciting. It usually involves real upside. I think an academic trusteeship being a 
wonderful conduit to bring brain food for the trustee is really valuable and 
important. I do at my university both think of creating those experiencing 
opportunities, whether a visit to Rome or my board is going to Paris with a 
particular agenda for trustees and their spouses. Those are things that happen in 
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invitations and opportunities during the year for people to get great exposure to 
new knowledge and new learning. Now, being on a university board I think, 
again, it comes down to quality caliber of your colleagues around the table. 
Actually, I think being a trustee is much more rewarding at this stage in my 
career. I’m not looking for a way to enhance my resume. I am much more 
oriented toward entrepreneurial companies at the early stage of business activity 
then in large corporation things that move slower. 
Trustee 6: When you're on a corporate board you are a corporate guy, and that is 
why you are asked to be on the corporate board. On an academic board you don't 
necessarily understand education, how it's done, so there is a difference there. 
Maybe if we were in the corporate world we would pound the table more. We had 
a situation here at my university, with a subsidiary, for them to tell our CFO the 
he could not sit in the meeting. We would never put up with that in a corporation. 
The academic board put up with that. 
Trustee 9: I think the expectations of board members are very similar on corporate 
and academic boards. You want to provide guidance. You want to provide input 
you want to share ideas. On the academic environment, it might be a little softer, 
but there have also been times we’ve had budget issues that we’ve gone at it, and 
you wouldn’t at a public company. I think there might be a little bit less legal and 
fiduciary responsibility, but corporate board members today know they can be 
personally liable and on the line so there is a heightened sensitivity. Now on 
corporate boards, you have to make sure you’ve dotted every I and crossed every 
T and asked every question, looked at every audit report, etc. I think that is how it 
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should be. I think in academia that is still little less. At the end the day, they sit 
back and think that it’s the CEO’s call. You can only push so far, but there are 
certain things that I feel are out of my hands. New programming, closing colleges, 
and opening colleges, so things are yielded to the folks that are running the 
institution.  
Trustee 4: The most important thing for me is that there is meaningful work on 
academic boards. On my corporate boards I have the ability to influence diversity 
as part of the agenda. I ran a capital campaign for the academic institution, and I 
was very involved. I'm not the chair of a committee on the corporate board, so I 
don't know if I have that level of work exposure required of chairs of committees. 
Both the corporate and academic boards I am discussing have been very 
rewarding to me personally and that hasn't been the case on other boards I've 
served. At my present academic institution, I really get to contribute in 
meaningful ways and that makes it very rewarding.  
Trustee 5: I can say my fundamental motivation at my organization and my 
motivation on the Board of Trustees are basically the same. I feel whatever talents 
and capabilities I have, and limitations that I have, I derive meaning and 
fulfillment by applying those to something that matters. So, if it's fulfilling our 
mission of the healthcare company or providing an education that transforms the 
students, the underlining drive is the same. It's why I do it. I don't feel it is a job. I 
view it, to some degree, as being able to contribute something that really advances 
the mission. It’s where I get the buzz, and it is the same on both boards. I am 
lucky and I realize that I operate in healthcare industry is easier to do than if I was 
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running other corporations that have to meet a market. I’ve been blessed in my 
life to spend my life in two industries, healthcare and education, that are unique as 
an economic good or unique in their intangibles. How do you put a value on 
advancing health care put a value on advancing knowledge? They are intangible, 
but priceless. My personal professional rewards change with your stage in life, as 
you get older, and your life situation changes, it does allow you to do what you do 
for the reasons I described earlier. I don't think you could find too many directors 
of public companies that don’t serve on nonprofit boards. I attribute it to a lot of 
things. People at a certain point their life have the time and interest to serve on 
boards. One of the reasons they do that is because of their intellectual curiosity 
the opportunity to be exposed to new people, new ideas, and new things. It 
maintains an energizing for them. They recognize they have gifts and talents that 
can be brought to the table to create value. I think they also take a step back and 
look at that the context of a not-for-profit. The motivations are the same for me on  
the corporate board and the academic board. 
Trustee 11: If I had to pick, I like the academic board, and the longer-term nature 
of the way it operates. It’s more similar to a private, small company. The public 
company is not what it is made up to be.  
Responses Related to Research Question Two: How do chief executive officers 
perceive corporate board governance influences academic board governance? Four 
themes were identified: 1. Corporate Influences; 2. The Great Divide; 3. Academic 
Lessons, and 4. Best Practices. 
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Corporate Influences. 
The study participants described several corporate board practices that academic 
boards could incorporate such as more focus, discipline, and clearer expectations. In 
research conducted by Baird (2006) on effective governance culture, the author looked at 
corporate and participatory board structures. The researcher examined processes to 
improve the credibility and consistency of internal governance controls in academic 
institutions. The impetus was to encourage a culture of continuous improvement.  
Trustee 6: Corporate boards are much more focused. All boards have problems 
with this. They set up an agenda, and they set up the same agenda and same 
reports instead of focusing on what is really important. Our recent academic 
governance task force looked at this, but we slid right back into what we were 
doing. Corporations have influenced academic boards in terms of metrics looking 
at the outcomes, all that is coming from corporations. Most good companies run 
like that, so if you see a push for that, it is coming from corporate board members. 
Trustee 10: Quite honestly in a corporate board meeting monthly really got people 
on board and, quite frankly, colleges don't do that. There is one thing when you 
run a board a particularly a college board. People may not be very familiar with 
everything that goes on. You need to be prepared when you're given information 
read it. To be honest with you, we get a lot of trustees that don't read it all. Read it 
so you are prepared. If you really don't have a grasp of something, take that as an 
opportunity to keep your mouth shut. A lot of trustees don't. They'll express an 
opinion that may not be well founded or well researched. That comes up from 
time to time, and it can send you off in a tangent. Compared to corporate boards 
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when you meet monthly, the volume of material is not huge. In a corporate world 
directors will call you or you invite them to do that, and it is not unreasonable to 
have a weekly call from one of them. I have not witnessed that on the academic 
board.  
Trustee 7: That's part of what the other boards have members that brought to the 
academic board is a discipline of measurement on the planning side of it. I think 
that academic boards are similar to the corporate boards, but they don't do it as 
such a way that is disciplined. They don't have the same discipline as a corporate 
board has. I would like to see more of it, but that's my corporate side speaking. I 
like to have, for example, more specific succession planning in place. I would like 
to have more specific budgets in place. I would like to see a capital plan in place 
as to what we are going to be doing in five years. I do think in the next 5 to 10 
years academic boards are going to have to get more disciplined. It is going to get 
a lot tighter to make break even, or make a profit on it. The rules are changing. 
Academic boards are much more in tuned to the student or in other words to their 
customer. They are much more modern thinking toward their customer, and they 
have daily customer interaction. Corporations don't have it. From a technology 
standpoint academic institutions are much further ahead than in any corporation 
I've seen. In terms of board member expectations comparing corporate and 
academic by donating your money in the academic board, you have some skin in 
the game. That does give me the ability to feel like my views are heard. On the 
corporate side, those board members feel that they have to contribute because 
they are getting compensated. They try to be helpful with opinions. It translates 
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directly to the academic board, we all give input with the best intentions in mind 
so this pretty much parallels. 
Trustee 8: For board members that I've been around, the expectations are much 
clearer in a corporate board. I have never ventured into a corporate board meeting 
that the members were not well prepared. They read the pre-read, they do their 
homework, and they are engaged. In an academic side, you get a lot people who 
do not do their homework. They come to the meeting. Some of this I believe is a 
result of the size. People think they're there to give back, as opposed to being 
passionate about it. On a corporate board, people are doing it for a specific reason. 
They're more incentivized to take it professionally and do the work. On the 
academic side, half the board members are really engaged and prepared for the 
meeting, and I have never seen that kind of lack of preparation on the corporate 
board level. I don't think it's a function of being compensated on a board for the 
time they give, and for the knowledge and experience they bring. They don't get 
paid that much. I think it's less about compensation and more about the risk and 
their own personal brand image. To have problems as a board member that would 
reflect that I'm not doing my job. It is a fear of my name being linked to 
something going wrong. In a university, you don't have those kinds of risks, that's 
why you don't get that kind of attention, so it has little to do with compensation. 
Trustee 1: I think there is a greater influence on finances and the mission of the 
University, social responsibility, and the experience of the corporate board 
members can be lent to the academic board members in these areas. And, our 
university had some serious financial troubles, before we had a leadership change. 
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And, frankly, the board did not previously do a good job of auditing those 
problems and fixing those problems. It has since been corrected. There is a 
continuing focus on finance and basic mission on both corporate and academic 
boards. That's a maturation process. My corporate board experience has been very 
rewarding and has assisted me in serving on the academic board in all the 
experiences that I've had and in the knowledge that I've gained. The academic 
board needs good stewards. They have to know what to look for and be sure that 
the bases are being covered. Financial growth of the University, enrollment, 
student life, and the mission of the University, the corporate experience really can 
help you to evaluate those factors. 
Trustee 3: Corporate boards will often have influence by having an academic on 
their boards so that culture begins to comingle and add value to each other. The 
big thing that is different is the clarity of the goals and the rigor and monitoring 
progress against them between the two boards. The other big thing is that there is 
great prestige on a big board and that matches your collegial interactions; the 
quality of who is at the table is very important. 
Trustee 5: The not-for-profit and universities sectors historically have not had the 
same kind of discipline and defined process and rigor, but that's changing quickly 
for the better. You see a big distinction in a practical manner, that you can't get 
away from, is a director of a public company is a paid position. It's not why 
people serve, generally speaking, although some do, it is almost as if it's because 
it's a volunteer. It is never articulated this way. It is my observation that many 
participants on not-for-profit boards, it is almost as if I do not have to have the 
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same degree of rigor and commitment because after all it's not paid. I'm not sure 
many people process it consciously that way, but that doesn't mean it doesn't 
exist. 
Trustee 9: Going back to the thought that a good majority of the people on the 
academic board come out of the corporate world, at very senior levels, is one of 
the many reasons the university wants them on the board, to bring their 
knowledge and expertise into the university. I am confident that it’s had a huge 
impact over the years and particularly in terms of Catholic and religious 
universities that have gone to lay boards and lay presidents. For example, at Notre 
Dame when they went from Holy Cross priests to a lay board you can trace back 
the way they are operated today to the corporate people that influenced that 
structure. 
Trustee 11: My academic board has a lot of the format of a corporate board. 
Overall, corporate governance influences academic governance in that the 
governance exists in corporations. I've given a lot of input into setting up my 
university’s governance structure from my public side experience. 
The Great Divide. 
The study participants noted several differences in the governance practices of 
corporate and academic boards. The comments were consistent with Rytmeister’s (2009) 
observation that academic boards lacked professional processes, as some participants 
noted the lack of rigor and board member preparedness on academic boards. 
Trustee 7: The politics of the two boards are really different. On the academic 
board, there's a social politic that isn't there in a corporate board. What I mean by 
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that is that you have to have a relationship with the president and the staff 
member beyond just the board meetings, because, you want them to open up to 
you if we have trouble. The regulations are completely different on an academic 
board because of government funding involved. 
Trustee 10: They are different animals no question about it and you have to mix 
the two when you can. You can't force something on one or the other. It has to be 
applicable. The business plan, in terms of corporate boards is an annual event a 
three-year outlook, but it rolls. I don't think colleges do as great a job as they can 
on that. Putting the plan on the shelf once you do it, doesn't do any good. It needs 
to be looked at periodically and when you're doing your projections whether 
quarterly, semiannually, annually. You need to go back and look at it. What did 
we say we were going to do? I do think colleges can do a better job with meshing 
that projection and reporting process. 
Trustee 11: On the academic board, we are not spending three months preparing 
for the next board meeting at least the board members are not. In those meetings, 
we are looking for longer-term visionary activities, where we going for longer 
term thinking and direction. I prefer the academic board because it's really how 
public board should be run but with all the shareholder activists and regulations it 
makes it impossible. It is counterproductive and difficult to look longer than in 
longer strategic planning mode. Those are the two major differences between 
academic board and a corporate board. 
Trustee 10: Historically, college CEOs have not been held to an identifiable 
performance level. That's changing; historically that was not the case. It's not a 
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bottom-line institution. It is if it is in the red, you have a problem. There isn’t that 
huge excitement that you would in the corporate world. That's changing today, 
but those are things were different and colleges are catching up to those areas 
now. For trustees, it is a voluntary job, drawing trustees can be difficult when 
colleges are having problems, or they bail out and that makes it very tough on the 
president. 
Trustee 3: There is freedom from legal liability and risk in things like that so 
people shy away today from corporate boards, because of all the corporate 
liability and risk. 
Trustee 11: The public board expectations are much more sensitive to legal and 
federal laws. They are very sensitive to that. That is not the case on the academic 
side. In a private school, they don't have to be driven by the federal laws that are 
placed on a public company, so the boards have very different expectations. 
Corporate boards have a lot of personal liability. On the corporate side there is 
about $100 million P&L insurance. They're worried about getting sued, and we 
don't worry about that so much on the academic side. They are getting advised by 
a law firm for the company management, and the board actually has another legal 
firm to protect themselves. Public boards are very sensitive to shareholders, class-
action lawsuits, environmental lawsuits, SEC security violations, because they all 
have inside information. On the public board, they are going to make a six-figure 
income being a public board member, and with that a tremendous amount of 
responsibility and accountability and a lot of legal issues on a public board. 
Versus the academic board – you are not being paid. You try to make long-term 
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decisions for the institution, and you really don’t worry about being sued or 
violating a federal or securities law. 
Trustee 10: What you can take away from corporate boards is there is a degree of 
liability, particularly on the corporate side, that you have to be aware of because if 
somebody messes up, it can get very expensive even with liability insurance that 
may not be enough. Colleges have it too, but it’s not as serious. 
Trustee 4: A good example is the academic boards have an investment committee 
that is led by outside professionals in the field, and you won't find that in a 
corporate environment. Academic boards have an executive committees and the 
corporate board I serve on does not have an executive committee. That might be 
attributed to size, the corporate board has approximately 12 people, and the 
academic board has 50 people. Academic boards also have an executive session 
without the CEO and that has not been the tradition in the corporate boardroom. 
Corporate boards have strategic retreats, though you have to be careful on who is 
invited beyond board members in order to maximize teambuilding and 
relationship building. 
Trustee 5: At every board meeting there is an executive session with me without 
management and without me. That's a best practice. We will get there overtime at 
the academic board. The board must have time to talk about itself from time to 
time without the CEO. It doesn't have to be every meeting, but it's just healthy. I 
encourage it. The challenges when you're somebody running an organization, you 
have to be able to step back and let your board apply proper governance. They 
always have to be viewed and balanced with the mission. I think the public sector 
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companies could learn from non-for profit and academic institutions in that sense. 
We don't have a committee for example at my organization on the mission, like 
saving and sustaining lives. But, could we do more to provide access to lower-
cost therapies medicines, devices that in some way broadens access. It may not 
generate the same relative profitability as mature markets, but it still generates an 
attractive return of capital. It may be, if we had a committee report on oversight 
and mission, we could do even more than we do now in that area. That's a 
tangible example of what I'm trying to say. We have our mission and identity for 
the university that strengthens the mission. 
Leadership: Board Chair Inside or Outside. 
The practice of corporate boards being led by inside or outside chairmen was 
another difference from the establish practice of academic boards being led exclusively 
by outside chairmen as described in these mixed opinions. 
Trustee 10: I've only experienced outside chairs in my life. Banking was kind of 
an anomaly; we always had an outside chair. That's just plain good governance as 
it gives the separation of powers. If there is one thing, I mentioned egos. If CEOs 
can get big heads, because things are going well until they don't. That's when 
everyone in the board looks at each other and says who's working with this 
person? That's why an outside chair is good. You communicate with that person 
daily if that person is doing their job. Maybe in some cases in my cases, daily on 
the drive home I would talk to my outside chair that way you're also protected. 
I'm a believer, and separation of CEO and chairman that's all I've known. 
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Trustee 6: Many have an outside chairman. My organization had it that way and 
others do. It is becoming more common, and I like it much better. It's much better, 
and I do think that the academics are ahead of the game doing it that way. 
Trustee 9: The role particularly in banking more and more there are more outside 
chairman. We went to that three or four years ago. It came off the financial crises, 
and the regulators are pushing pretty hard for that separation between in-house 
people and external people. I think it makes sense in the academic institutions 
because that person would typically bring a different perspective and not running 
the day-to-day operation. I’m still not sold that it makes sense in the corporate 
arena, but it’s also the reality of the regulatory environment. It is very prominent 
in financial services. I don’t know how prominent it is outside financial services. 
Trustee 11: I believe you should have a chairman that is outside the company. 
Where there is chairman and CEO, I would automatically recommend that a lead 
director be appointed by the board. I am personally in favor of separating the two 
roles. 
Trustee 1: The chair of corporations is usually an insider, as opposed to academic 
chairs being on the outside. That system my personal opinion is that if there are 
appropriate checks and balances and the insider is the best choice for the CEO, 
rather than a total outsider, because as a total outsider you don't know what they 
know about the business, of nuances the intricacies as an insider who grows up 
with the company knows all the nuances. I see that increasingly in business they 
recruit outsiders who are either presidents or CEOs of other companies. Which 
tells me that there is a basic lack of management development in a lot of the 
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companies today in America, which disturbs me. In the academic model, the 
chairman is outside the University, because they have the commitment to the 
university and the basic life experiences that can help them run any big business. 
They have an appreciation for the mission, and the student health, and life of the 
University, as well as finance. They are well prepared, and it acts as a check and 
balance on the president and CEO. 
Trustee 4: I like the idea of outside executive chairs it works well at the corporate 
level. 
Trustee 2: Corporate boards are chaired by internal people and academic boards 
are chaired by outside people. These are two different beasts. It makes sense to 
have a corporate board chair that is run by individuals inside a company, although 
as we've seen in the past 10-15 years, the public watchdogs have sought that the 
board be led by an outside director. They prefer to not have the CEO be the 
Chairman. Corporate governance has followed the advice of these outside groups 
that looked at the running of companies and felt that it was in the shareholder's 
best interest to separate the two titles. Some companies have a lead director. 
Otherwise the inside guy’s salary and everything is predicated on the running of 
the company, and outside directors aren’t truly carrying out their responsibilities. 
This avoids the image of being rubber stamped on the inside. In the old days 
many met board members who were country club members and friends of the 
CEO. It goes on to some extent now, but it still protects the shareholders’ value 
by having an outside chair. I would say today most Fortune 100 companies have 
the title separated. I think that's a good thing. In the case of an academic board it's 
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a little different. At my academic institution the board has responsibility to be as 
supportive as possible to the president to carry out the mission. The chairman of 
the trustees has an extraordinarily important role in assessing how the president is 
doing and assessing what help she may need. There may be some areas that that 
person is very strong in, and other areas that are not her strengths. That’s where 
the chairman comes in and makes sure to best provide more support in some 
areas. 
Trustee 5: At my corporation, we have an outside lead director. I serve as both 
CEO and chairman there is an increasing trend to separate the chair and CEO 
roles, as I am sure you've seen in the literature there are pros and cons to that. 
That is the only model in Europe. Not so much in the US, but if you have a 
combined role like we do at my organization without exception you have a lead 
director. We have a lead director position that really serves as a nonexecutive 
chair. 
Trustee 7: In terms of having the chairman of firm inside the company, I think the 
corporate culture inside a business really is critical as for most of them fail. 
Trustee 9: The separation of chairman and CEO I think it's a good thing it's just 
good governance. There is a big trend in business to separate those two roles, and 
it's just a great thing even though I didn't personally have a good experience with 
my chairman it is just good governance. It provides a good balancing act between 
those two roles, especially in today's business environment. The chairman has to 
have separation from the day-to-day activities of the business. It's a healthy thing. 
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Academic Lessons. 
The study participants identified several practices that academic boards have 
established that could be adopted by corporate boards. The comments made supported 
Feyerherm’s (2009) proclamation that the academic board approach to board membership 
utilizing a co-learning model was unique to corporate boards. Gee (2006) supported 
Feyerherm’s position by noting that university presidents, like their corporate 
counterparts, were responsible for managing their organizations. Gee defined the unique 
difference between the two structures was that academic presidents govern through 
powers of persuasion and collaboration, a theme reinforced by this study’s participants.  
Trustee 10: I think colleges are pretty good at shared governance for the most 
part. That could be given some consideration in the corporate world, although in 
the corporate world directors hire somebody to run the company and expect that 
person to run the company. They didn't want to mess with that for the most part. 
You can find in colleges were the president might be over helped sometimes by 
trustees, and I've been a strong believer in if somebody overstepped the bounds, 
we have to remind them we hired this person to run the college and let them come 
back to us if you don't like it, then vote on it. The shared governance could 
perhaps leak in the corporate world a little bit. 
Trustee 9: Academic board practices that corporate boards should adopt, in 
general, the mission and branding piece could certainly translate into businesses 
as well. For the most part businesses will do guiding principles vision and 
mission, particularly being involved in a religious institution as we talked earlier 
that is always at the core in businesses. We will anchor back to the efficient, but I 
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think it is more focused on the profitability and driving that inherently is having a 
sound brand and great reputation. The continued focus around what are, we in 
business, for beyond the shareholders and the customers, but what about the 
employees and communities. Actually, we’ve tried to focus a fair amount on that. 
I think the academic boards to a better job, and on business development and 
capital campaigns. On a regular basis, the board members are being involved and 
engaged personally and in terms of helping raise money. The correlation to that 
on the corporate side, I don’t think we ask enough of our board members to help 
develop to our business. They are all well connected. I think it may be 
preconceived as taboo, but typically we are doing business with them personally 
and their companies. Obviously the people are large-company CEOs that have 
lots of vendors and contacts and networks. I don’t think we have tapped that. 
Especially in big companies board members of Fortune 500 companies have 
board members from all over the country in the world. They fly into per two days 
of meetings they fly out again. They focus on their responsibilities as a director 
and their committees. It could be extremely valuable for the company, if the 10 
directors referred two very attractive business pieces per year and that would be 
attractive to the shareholder. We have a lot of our employees on not-for-profit 
boards, and we provide a four-day session of the responsibilities of being on a 
nonprofit board what are the expectations. The world has gotten more complex 
and complicated so you can’t just show up and say now what do I do. We teach 
the roles responsibility. I sat in on one. I sat on nonprofit boards for 30 years. It 
may not make sense to teach in the undergraduate or MBA level. Taking it to a 
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corporate level makes a lot of sense particularly as people are coming back later 
in life especially in executive education programs. 
Trustee 8: Corporations could look better at mission and branding. Financial 
results and returning value to shareholders over what period of time, today's 
business environment is about today, this month, this quarter, this year. You can 
make some shortsighted decisions. Universities do good job at mission and 
branding and taking a longer-term view of the art. Better with long-term value. 
Trustee 10: Corporate people realize an academic organization was a different 
animal. When you set up a course, you can't cancel it the following month. You 
may have to run it for three years to see if people go through the cycle. It takes a 
while for corporate people to see that colleges have a time flow that corporations 
do not tolerate, they cut and go. Colleges don't. That is something from the 
corporate standpoint. They bring their ideas in, and they have to find a mixture so 
to speak. 
Best Practices. 
Corporate Processes. All the Trustees described the influence of corporate board 
experience was apparent on the academic boards they served. The participants 
acknowledged that the majority of the members of academic boards they served were 
employed in the corporate world, consistent with Larcker and Tayan’s (2011) research 
that CEO level experience was desirable in board members. The participants described 
the reason for this phenomenon was due to the fact that academic boards sought member 
attributes of philanthropic means, in addition to leadership and a prominent position in 
the community. 
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Trustee 10: When I look at the corporate involvement on the academic board, 
which is significant. They don't need to do this, but when they get involved, you 
have to prove to them their value. It is up to the president to do, and if they don't 
do that, they will lose interest, and you will lose them. You have to do it fairly 
quickly, and they will put their heart in it. 
Trustee 8: There are a couple of areas that academic boards are behind corporate 
boards and one is talent management and succession planning, and the other is 
compensation approach. They're both related. Corporations today are monitoring 
a much better job than they were 10 years ago, especially succession planning for 
the president the senior level positions. Universities are way behind on that, they 
think people are going to stay in those positions until they die or physically and 
mentally unable to perform their duties. There is a much longer-term cycle in a 
university than in a corporation. Being great instructors for young people and 
teaching the next generation how to be great leaders and individuals, we are 
struggling as a board to try to figure out how do you deal with compensation and 
tenure in a marketplace that you need tenure to compete and attract the right 
talent, but too much of it is no good. Those are two areas (succession planning 
and performance pay) are starting to dig into on the academic side. A lot of it is 
driven because our corporate board members and me have had to deal with that in 
the corporate world, and we are bringing that to the academic board. I tell my 
president you are running a big business with a huge budget, and you're dealing 
with the same issues that a CEO of a business runs in to. You may not want to 
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admit this publicly, because of mission and values, but you're running a business, 
and it is fact.  
Trustee 3: The academic board sometimes is not clear what the annual goals are 
and corporate boards are. This year we are going to grow by X amount, we are 
going to improve our profitability by certain amounts, and increase customer 
base, and new product introduction, whatever. Progress is tracked against a goal. I 
personally think that academia could be a lot more cost efficient. 
Trustee 5: There is a convergence of the two types of governance and the reason 
is the underlying issues are the same, right. Each entity has stakeholders of which 
directors or trustees have this very fundamental obligation or responsibility. It's 
just that in the corporate world, there is a shareholder in the traditional sense, but 
the traditional shareholder is one of multiple stakeholders of a company. 
Ultimately, the traditional shareholder in the University is no different. You have 
this array of stakeholders, and when you think of this in a fundamental and 
simplistic way, there isn't a big difference in responsibilities, which is why you 
see this convergence. I don't think you could find too many directors of public 
companies that aren’t involved in at least one or numerous not-for-profit 
organizations in the community. 
Trustee 2: Academic boards to some extent have already adopted many the 
corporate practices. There is a separation of governance and utilization of 
committees. I'm not certain there are any corporate governance practices that 
academic board should adopt. I can see how things that we had done at my 
corporate board have helped me as a trustee of the academic board. I made 
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recommendations. There are certainly best practices and best in class ideas that 
are done on corporate boards that can be passed on to the academic board and 
vice versa. From the University standpoint they are more apt to rely on outside 
consultants in brainpower and on campus for a particular problem. They're more 
willing to do that than publicly traded companies. From time-to-time you have to 
bring in outside firm who specializes in a particular area just like search, that's 
what they do. Some companies aren't willing to look at outside consultants in that 
manner. At my university they were more willing to seek outside experts when 
help is needed. 
Trustee 4: Another caution I would like to discuss is that there's a trend now for 
corporate boards to seek board members from global companies and locations. I 
think we need to be cautious about that because what makes a corporate board 
have a strong team is the fact that you're seeing people locally more than six times 
a year. You're seeing them at other functions in the city that you live. You'll see 
them on other boards. You build a relationship so that when it comes time to 
speak up in a board meeting you have a comfort level that these are people who 
really know each other. The threat here is if you have people flying in globally six 
times a year for only the meeting, you never have that opportunity to bond with 
them as individuals. I see that as a threat for governance in general. Academic 
boards should be cautious when they have board dinners with a cast of thousands 
as that affects the ability of the academic board to build a team. For instance the 
corporate dinners may have speakers from a specific group at the board dinner, 
but it's never more than the board members and those people, so you have a group 
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of 20. In a small board dinner, you really can ask specific questions and 
understand the topics and get to know each of the board members individually. I 
think corporate boards are leading diversity initiatives and academic boards do 
not have that level of commitment at this time. 
Trustee 6: Expectations of academic board members are far fewer than corporate 
boards. There are so many people on academic boards to rely on, which you do 
not have on a corporate board. For instance I've been on this board nine years, and 
I was never asked to be a chair of the committee. I would've done it. I'm perfectly 
okay, but I would've done it. 
Term limits. 
There were no corporate terms limits reported by the study participants though 
most publicly traded organizations have moved to the annual reelection of all directors, 
which contrasted to the common practice of academic boards enforcing term limits, often 
to three or four terms. The practice of enforcing term limits was described by some of the 
participants as a risk to good governance due to longevity signaled institutional 
knowledge gained over time. 
Trustee 9: There were no term limits, and we are putting in more expectations of 
board members. The members tend to know when the time has come to leave the 
board. Because it's not a public board, some people like that because there isn't 
the fiduciary responsibility, but other people may feel that it's more cosmetic then 
a full-fledged legal board. There are some legal responsibilities of the sort, but 
certainly not near the public board responsibilities. If they're participating 
providing input, attending the meetings, helping us get connected in the 
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community, then the continuity provided by no term limits can be good. If they're 
not doing that, then we both have to come together and say this probably isn't 
meeting both of our expectations. 
Trustee 10: The average corporate directors stayed 10 to 11 years and this was all 
men, before the days that we really looked for diversity. There really wasn't a 
need to have limits. They took themselves off the board if the time came. For the 
academic board, term limits and age limits are a three-year term and every three 
years and the Trusteeship Committee looks at those people and approaches them 
to stand for reelection. Colleges are not really good at evaluating trustees so to 
speak. We all talk to do better and send out forms, but in my experience we never 
asked somebody not to run again. They can run for three-year terms until they 
reach the age of 75. 
Trustee 1: Today corporate governance is dictating that board members be 
reelected every year. Age 72 is about an average for term limits. 
Trustee 8: On the academic board, there are four-year terms. You can serve three, 
four-year terms. You can renew after the 12 years. You could step off for a least a 
year and come back, and that's been a pretty normal practice. There are no age 
limits. Tenure and experience in the chair and vice chair are very important 
things. You don't want to be shortsighted in terms of term limits continuity and 
history is an important thing. 
Trustee 3: The corporate board did not have term limits or age limits there is 
dialogue now about possible age limits. For example, a former Secretary of State 
decided once the company went public he wanted to move to an emeritus, so that 
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he did not have the liability of somebody making accusations toward his age. In 
terms of the implementation of academic board term limits, I don't know how 
good that it's going to be. It seems to me that if you have a hard rule like that, and 
you're going to take some people from very involved and supportive, and then tell 
them now you're off you just can't expect the same level of involvement support 
from them. They will have other things that will fill that space. And so I am 
worried about what that term limit thing will do actually. There's always the issue 
of people just hanging on and taking slots, but that can be handled in a more 
flexible way by simply asking people if they really want to continue. I think a lot 
of times they will read into the question that they need either step it up or come 
off. What you're trying to get with term limits is keeping it refreshed and 
committed without the hard rule that could cause you to lose great support. 
Trustee 4: In terms of age limits, we have to be cautious on both academic and 
corporate boards because the longer people serve, and if they're very good they 
gain institutional knowledge, which takes time to acquire. I served a four-year 
honorary term. I think most of that was for people to be able to rub elbows with 
celebrities like former members of a presidential cabinet. At my present academic 
institution, I really get to contribute in meaningful ways and that makes it very 
rewarding. 
Trustee 5: My corporate board has stated age limits, which is 72. One of the 
biggest challenges, particularly in large public companies, is a supply of 
experienced directors. What you are seeing here is a couple of trends. One is 
people are raising their age limits and getting away from each limits altogether. 
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They are saying there is a whole pool of people above the age of 72 with 
wonderful experience that we should tap into, that would be great contributors to 
the company. Because we have this guideline, the age limit, they are no longer 
eligible. The other trend you see is the size of boards. Our board has 13 directors, 
and I am the only management director. In today's world, that is somewhat large. 
You are seeing a trend toward smaller boards.  
Conclusions 
The world of governance has certainly changed since the passing of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. This research attempted to bridge the gap of knowledge on the 
convergence of corporate and academic governance with this descriptive case study 
encompassing the opinions of the participants themselves. Oxholm (2005) examined the 
implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and noted that the regulation did not 
apply to institutions of higher education. The author emphasized that the intent of the Act 
was consistent with the aspirations of academia and recommended that colleges and 
universities adopt best practices from the Act to improve transparency and accountablity 
within and outside higher education. Supporting this position, Gee (2006) suggested that 
the Act imposed challenges for all management groups including volunteer boards in 
higher education, as it provided a model of best practices for financial responsibility and 
the importance of designating proper fiscal authority within corporations. It was no 
surprise to this writer that many of the participants in this descriptive case study linked 
their corporate governance accountabilities to their role in academic governance, as the 
Act has been in force for more than a decade and this particular cohort of CEOs were 
properly schooled. 
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The lack of professionalization was observed on academic boards and cited by 
Balch (2008) who asserted that trustees have an important role as mediators and leaders 
in the academic community. Balch suggested that academic trustees interject more 
corporate-like governance attributes to academic governance in order to professionalize 
governance. Balch’s recommendations supported the research goals of this project in 
terms of gaining new information by soliciting the perceptions of CEOs serving on 
corporate and academic boards. 
The rich text of the content provided by the words of the CEOs in this qualitative 
case study contributed to the validity of the study. In every response, the CEOs provided 
both context and confirmation of their statements and opinions. In summary, the analysis 
of the interviews with the CEOs serving as academic trustees revealed several areas of 
variances between the two governance models related to: making decisions and member 
preparedness; mission and shareholder value; and personal and professional rewards, 
which directly correlated to the research questions of this study.  
• CEOs described the decision making process on the academic board as laborious 
and untimely. They also noted that corporate board decisions are focused on 
short-term results, as opposed to academic board decisions focused on long-term 
strategies. 
• CEOs noted that corporate board members were better prepared for board 
meetings in terms of having a firm knowledge of the pre-read materials. 
• CEOs admitted that corporate board membership accompanies greater personal 
financial risk, along with financial rewards of compensation in contrast to 
academic boards that are unpaid and seek member donations. 
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• CEOs recognized that academic boards have not adopted strategic planning 
processes and succession planning protocols that are prominent oversight 
concerns of corporate boards. 
• CEOs appreciated the academic boards commitment to the mission of the 
institutions and participants suggested that corporations adopt a focus on mission. 
• CEOs called out that academic institutions were amenable to utilizing outside 
experts or consultants more readily than corporations. This deferring to experts 
was considered positive management of issues. 
• CEOs described academic use of technology more advanced than in corporations. 
• CEOs explained their academic board service as more personally rewarding than 
their corporate board service. 
The study revealed several areas of alignment between the two governance models in 
terms of board membership and member selection, motivation for service, and the 
utilization of skills.  
• CEOs remarked that both the corporate and academic boards relied on board 
member recommendations for gathering a pool of potential board candidates, as a 
primary method of recruiting new members. 
• CEOs appreciated the mental stimulation of utilizing their skills for service on 
both corporate and academic boards. 
• CEOs reported serving on corporate and academic boards enhanced their 
professional personae. 
• CEOs inferred that the quality of their constituencies on the boards contributed to 
the prominence of their service. 
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Implications and Recommendations 
The best practices of board governance have been identified for expanding 
knowledge within the Academy from the viewpoint of the insiders, whose physical board 
work remains conducted behind closed doors. This study provided a glimpse into this 
important social construct. It is routine for corporate board members to serve on 
academic boards creating undeniable influence from corporate boards to academic 
boards. While many similarities were observed between the two governance models, the 
board members, as study participants, also discussed many distinctive differences. This 
researcher identified these areas outside the margins as learning opportunities.  
The CEOs asserted that meaningful work was crucial to their participation on the 
board. The participants agreed that terms limits on either academic or corporate boards 
risked the loss of institutional knowledge and commitment to the organization by a lack 
of continuity that time allows. The level of expertise required for corporate board 
membership was reported to be critical for corporate boards, as opposed to ideal in 
academic boards. The participants reported that academic boards also sought members 
with the financial means to support the institution, which was a criteria not reported for 
corporate board membership. These contrasting specifications for board membership 
criteria are areas seasoned for future quantitative research. None of the study participants 
offered knowledge or experience in higher education as criteria for academic board 
membership. 
Gee (2006) acknowledged that academic culture is not wedded to the financial 
results that dominate corporate culture, and the business leaders particpating in this study 
accepted that they had considerably greater personal liability and legal consequences on 
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the corporate boards than academic boards. The CEOs appreciated the importance of 
building personal relationships among other board members in order to be comfortable 
asking tough questions in board meetings for both academic and corporate roles. 
Relationship building was considered essential to strengthening governance. Corporate 
board members reiterated that there were clearer expectations of corporate board 
members more than academic board members. These are several areas that academic 
boards need to focus on in order to improve their governance responsibilities.  
Academic board members appreciated that their institutions had a clear 
commitment to their mission, which board members respected and reported lacking in 
comparison to their corporate organizations. Many participants expressed their work on 
the academic board was more rewarding than the corporate board. A specific example 
extracted from the interviews was that Academic boards have Investment Committees of 
outside experts to protect the organizational assets, a practice described as unseen in 
corporate organizations. The data also identified that Academic institutions appreciated 
the expertise of outside experts or consultants at an observed level not found in corporate 
organizations. The use of technology in academic institutions was considered superior to 
corporate organizations, and it was noted that academic board members lacked 
preparedness for meetings in contrast to corporate board members being well-prepared.  
For future consideration, corporate boards would benefit from asserting a mission 
to the organizational goals, retaining strong board members without term limits, 
considering outside consultants for their expertise, and by utilizing an Investment 
Committee of community experts. Academic boards would benefit from exerting clear 
expectations for board members, implementing strategic planning, succession planning, 
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and more corporate-like professionalization board practices. Both corporate and academic 
boards need to ensure board members have meaningful work to utilize their skills and 
expertise to improve board member engagement. 
The Academy is known for educating generations of students, so it is a perfect 
institution to take up the cause of educating board members. Corporate governance 
academies are well established across the USA. There are corporate board governance 
programs offered at Harvard, Yale, the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of 
Business, Stanford University, the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, 
Dartmouth, Columbia, Duke, and UCLA, Andersen School of Management to name a 
few. They are supplemented by an equally robust list of professional organizations 
dedicated to education and training programs on corporate governance. However, this 
writer could not locate a single college or university program devoted to higher education 
academic board member education and only two professional organizations offering 
educational programs for four-year institutions of higher education and their academic 
boards members: The Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities 
(AGB) and The American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA). The time is ripe for 
the Academy to step up and invest in the education and professionalization of academic 
board members whose decisions impact the financial and reputational risk management 
of the academic enterprises across the country and around the world. This disparity in 
educational opportunities between corporate and academic governance whether real or 
perceived, is an area of concentration recommended for future research, and in particular, 
action. 
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This researcher’s final thoughts reflect back to the beginning of this research 
quest. The author was unable to uncover research linking the convergence of corporate 
and academic boards similar to the focus of this descriptive case study. That exploration 
began an odyssey into the untapped depth of knowledge generously delivered by chief 
executive officers who served as academic trustees. The themes that were exposed during 
the interviews with the CEOs offered a plethora of governance practices that were 
described as idyllic, worrying, or steadfast. Given the heightened interest in the work, the 
role, and the responsibilities of governance boards, this research study unlatched the 
closed doors of governance boards, and it opened up new possibilities for those seeking 
best in class practices that both corporate and academic boards can embrace. 
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Interview Questions Related to Research Question One 
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1. How many members are there on the corporate board of the company that you 
serve as a director? 
2. How would you describe the state of term limits and age limits on the corporate 
board you served? 
3. How many committees are there on the corporate board? 
4. How would describe the selection process for corporate board membership? 
5. How would you describe the expertise level sought for the corporate board 
membership? 
6. How many members are there on the academic board that you serve? 
7. How would you describe the influence of board size on board dynamics? 
8. How would you describe the state of term limits and age limits on the academic 
board you serve? 
10. How would you describe the selection process for academic board membership? 
11. How would you describe the expertise level sought for the academic board 
membership? 
12. How would you describe the challenges for corporate boards to protect 
shareholder value in comparison to academic boards’ responsibility to protect the 
mission in academic institutions? 
13. How would you describe and compare the decision-making processes of corporate 
and academic boards? 
14. How would you describe your personal and professional rewards in serving on 
corporate and academic boards? 
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15. Academic boards are chaired by individuals outside the organization, while many 
corporate boards are chaired by individuals inside the corporation. Please describe 
your perceptions of why these two structures are suitable or not. 
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Interview Questions Related to Research Question Two 
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1. How would you describe any governance practices on corporate boards that you 
would recommend be adopted by academic boards? 
2. How would you describe governance practices on academic boards that you 
would recommend be adopted by corporate boards? 
3. How would you describe and provide examples of how corporate board 
governance has influenced academic board governance? 
4. Would you like to discuss something I did not mention about your experiences 
serving on both corporate and academic boards? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
